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 Abstract 
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was established by the Food Security Act of 
1985 for the purpose of retiring environmentally sensitive cropland for a period of ten to fifteen 
years.  The initial focus of the program was to reduce on-site soil erosion and excess crop 
production, however the program benefits were later expanded to include water quality and 
wildlife habitat among others.  The overall success of the CRP has been questioned due to the 
occurrence of slippage.  The term ‘slippage’ as it relates to the CRP occurs when producers plant 
newly cultivated land or fallow acres, offsetting acreage that is retired through enrollment in the 
reserve program.  The goal of this study is to measure the degree to which slippage has affected 
the CRP within the state of Kansas; and to analyze the relationship between agricultural 
commodity output prices and input cost with respect to county level slippage rates. 
Annual slippage calculations for all one-hundred and five counties within Kansas for the 
period of 1995-2005 reveal significant spatial disparity, with the vast majority of slippage 
occurring in the western two-thirds of the state.  Annual fluctuations in slippage rates varied both 
regionally and at the county level.  Maximum annual slippage was seen in the northwest, with 
slippage rates in excess of 100 percent; thus the CRP was entirely ineffective in regards to 
reducing overall land in production.  Minimums were located primarily in the southeast and 
included slippage values below zero percent; indicating a reduction in acreage beyond that of the 
CRP. 
To analyze the relationship between agricultural commodity output prices and input costs 
with CRP slippage, a multivariate regression model was used.    The regression analysis 
ultimately showed a significant lack of fit within the model, indicating the need for additional 
predictor variables in order to account for variations in CRP slippage rates.  Although the model 
does indicate the presence of a minor relationship between the selected variables of agricultural 
commodity output prices and input costs with CRP slippage rates, further analysis is needed to 
identify additional county level variables impacting slippage.   
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
Agricultural production in rural regions has long been a primary source of employment, 
driving rural economies, shaping their culture and values, and supporting urban populations. 
Government intervention in regard to agricultural production has also been a key force in rural 
areas.  Although the catastrophe of the ‘Dust Bowl’ brought about the introduction of 
government programs for soil conservation, the agricultural practices that had contributed to the 
problem not only continued, but intensified.  After the Second World War, the developed world 
began to undergo a dramatic change in the form of productivist agriculture.  As defined by 
Woods (2005), the central aim of productivist agriculture was to increase agricultural production, 
which happened through intensification, concentration, and specialization.  The “productivist” 
shifts led to the increased use of large machinery and agri-chemicals, larger farm units, and a 
decrease in employment availability for the ‘generalist’ farm-worker (Troughton 2005).  In other 
words, large, often corporate, farms began to replace the ‘traditional’ (smaller, more diversified, 
and more household-based) farms in rural regions, with production demands driven by a world 
market economy and government supports.  Productivism’s central objective of increasing 
agricultural production was an unparalleled success, particularly through the changes that 
occurred in connection with what has become known as the Green Revolution, leading to an 
overabundance of agricultural goods that could not be sold at profit in the marketplace.  
Governments intervened, in part by purchasing crop surpluses in an attempt to guarantee stable 
income to farmers.  These price supports eventually began to place a financial burden on society 
as a whole, however.  Farmers who had been encouraged to borrow money for the purchase of 
large machinery and on-farm improvements found themselves struggling to make ends meet due 
to increased interest rates and periods of drought leading to low crop production (Dudley 2000, 
Woods 2005).  This ‘farm crisis’ resulted in moderate shifts in the way that the productivist 
agricultural model was applied, as many producers began to see the need for more stable and 
sustainable agricultural practices.  As indicators of environmental degradation such as soil 
erosion and decreased water quality became increasingly evident, the developed world began to 
realize that sustainable agriculture was not a luxury, but rather a necessity (Rasmussen et al. 
1998).  
Throughout the development of conservation programs in the United States, there has 
been variation in both program goals and levels of success.  Early efforts, such as the Soil Bank 
Program (SBP) started in 1956, focused on land retirement for the purpose of decreasing crop 
production in an attempt to increase commodity output prices, as well as diminishing erosion 
problems.  With much of the focus on production and price control, the SBP was not very 
successful at decreasing environmental degradation (Potter 1998).  In the early years (1986-
1990) of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), there was also criticism that the program 
was too focused on land retirement for decreasing production, with a focus on maximizing the 
acreage enrolled rather than only retiring those lands that would have the greatest environmental 
benefits.  The 1990 Farm Bill furthered the objectives of the CRP to include additional 
environmental benefits, utilizing the Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) as a tool for targeting 
lands for retirement.  Although a step in the right direction regarding the decrease of 
environmental degradation on agricultural lands, economic drivers such as high commodity 
output prices and increased world market demand may serve to decrease conservation program 
efficiency and effectiveness.   
            
Purpose 
As geographers, we have the ability to perform spatial analysis at varying scales.  The 
very nature of our work deals with identifying relationships.  These are both skill sets that should 
prove invaluable in exploring the interconnected workings of human-environment interactions in 
rural areas.  As noted by Woods (2005), environmental change in rural areas, including the 
degradation of the environment by modern agriculture and the encroachment of urban areas, is of 
growing interest to rural geographers concerned with land use issues.  Geographers are well 
equipped to deal with the complexities of rurality, rural change, and rural governance (Cloke 
1996).   
This paper attempts to address concerns regarding a specific example of rural policy, 
namely the effectiveness of the CRP as a program for land retirement and those factors that alter 
program efficiency.  Within the past decade there has been considerable geographical research 
pertaining to government agricultural policies such as the CRP and Conservation Reserve 
Enhancement Program (CREP) (Leathers and Harrington 2000, Wu 2000, Lant et al. 2001, Yang 
 2
et al. 2005), as well as more general considerations of the geographies of agricultural legislation 
(Dixon and Hapke 2003).  In short, the discipline of geography is well established in the study of 
rural human-environment interactions and the associated policy decision making implications. 
This study will further previous research (Leathers and Harrington 2000, Wu 2000) by 
applying the methods used for slippage calculation to the near-present – as close to the present as 
data availability allows – and attempting to identify those factors which contribute to change in 
CRP slippage. 
 
Problem Statement and Objectives 
The term “slippage” as it relates to the CRP occurs when producers plant newly 
cultivated land or fallow acres, offsetting acreage that is retired through enrollment in the reserve 
program.  Previous studies regarding slippage (Ericksen and Collins 1985, Leathers and 
Harrington 2000, Wu 2000) indicated two major possibilities of factors contributing to slippage.  
The first factor is substitution and the second is output price increase.  Slippage due to 
substitution occurs when farmers with land enrolled in the CRP break previously uncultivated or 
fallow land in an attempt to make up the difference in cropped acreage.  The Sodbuster and 
Swampbuster provisions were included in the Food Security Act of 1985 as an attempt to curb 
this practice, but enforcement problems have hampered their effectiveness (Wu 2000).  Output 
price increase refers to the increase in slippage due to higher commodity output prices, and can 
result in farmers without enrolled land tilling previously uncropped areas.  Higher output prices 
for agricultural commodities could be caused by the decrease in output (quantity supplied) 
associated with decreased production on CRP land or through increased market demand for 
agricultural outputs.  
According to Wu (2000), if substitution is the major factor causing slippage, then 
preventing slippage could be accomplished by focusing on participating farmers.  However, if 
output price increases are the major contributing factor, a focus on participant farmers would not 
be sufficient.  Leathers and Harrington (2000) and Wu (2000) recognized the need for further 
temporal research regarding the magnitude of price related slippage.  These studies also noted 
the negative impacts of government agricultural subsidies on conservation programs.  As a 
follow-up, my research attempts to address the question: “Is there a relationship between 
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fluctuations in agricultural commodity output prices, input costs and Conservation Reserve 
Program slippage rates in Kansas?”  The following tasks were accomplished to address this 
question: 
1) Determination of the annual slippage rates for each county in Kansas between 1995 
and 2005, using agricultural statistics at the county level.  
2) Refinement of the study area by excluding those counties with a negative average 
annual slippage value for the study period (1995-2005). 
3) Collection of annual grain crop output prices, input costs and land values in Kansas 
between 1995 and 2005, using agricultural statistics at the district and regional levels. 
4) Completion of statistical analyses to determine the strength of relationships between 
annual CRP slippage rates, agricultural commodity output prices and production costs. 
 
  
Justification 
The initial focus of the CRP was to reduce on-site soil erosion and excess crop 
production, while positively affecting commodity prices.  The goal was to establish conservation 
reserves totaling 40 to 45 million acres by the year 1990 (CES 1995).  As of October 2008, 
Kansas had approximately 3.1 million acres of land enrolled in the CRP, bringing in $123.3 
million in federal monies annually (FSA 2008).  Considering the large amount of taxpayer 
funding spent on the program, any effort to better understand those factors that have a negative 
and/or positive impact on program benefits and efficiency is well justified and may aid further 
policy development.   
Studies (Skold 1989, Riddel and Skold 1997) have indicated that cropland retirement 
policies such as the CRP have a minimal impact in terms of reduction in acreage of harvested 
cropland and even less effect on reducing production amounts.  The latter may be due to an 
increase in per acre output or the fact that it is generally lower productivity land that is taken out 
of production, a side effect of retiring the most environmentally sensitive cropland that would be 
difficult to overcome.  However inefficient the CRP may be in reducing excess crop production 
or increasing commodity prices, there are many studies (Cunningham 2005, Gray and Teels 
2006, Lovell and Sullivan 2006) that extol the program benefits in terms of the decrease in 
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environmental degradation and increase in wildlife habitat.  The purpose of this research is not to 
refute the site-specific environmental benefits of land retired through the CRP, but rather to 
determine those factors that decrease the overall efficiency of the program in achieving these 
benefits at a larger scale.  Such information can help in future development and increased 
effectiveness of government conservation and land retirement programs.   
Slippage calculations alone are a general indicator of the efficiency of the CRP in 
reducing the amount of land that is in crop production.  These calculations do not take into 
account the unique benefits of individual parcels of land.  However, placing previously 
uncultivated or idle acreage into crop production (slippage) has a negative impact to some extent, 
no matter what the land’s EBI score (Gilley and Doran 1997).  Therefore, identifying those 
factors that increase or decrease slippage rates can help to guide program decision making and 
increase the overall benefit to cost ratio of the CRP.  
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CHAPTER 2 - Background 
Conservation Programs Development 
The largest ‘payment for conservation’ programs can be divided into two groups based 
on their general approach.  Land retirement programs remove land from production (generally 
cropland); working-land programs provide assistance to producers who maintain conservation 
practices on land in production.  The following focuses on the development of land retirement 
programs. 
Commodity price supports have been a mainstay in agricultural legislation since the farm 
depression of the 1920s and have included acreage reduction programs in some form since the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1933.  Established as part of a New Deal agricultural 
policy, the focus of the AAA was the reduction of production by means of controlling crop 
acreages on individual farms (Hill 2003).  Under the AAA, producers who complied with the 
approved reduction in crop acreage on their farm received a benefit payment.  Issues regarding 
the funding source for the program led to the Supreme Court declaring the AAA unconstitutional 
in 1936.  The Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 was passed as emergency 
legislation in response to this, shifting the focus of the overall program to income protection and 
resource conservation (Cochrane and Runge 1992).  It is not surprising, given the timing of this 
legislation in relation to the ‘Dust Bowl’ era, that the resource conservation portion of this Act 
involved paying farmers to take acreage out of traditional row crop production and plant those 
acres to legumes and grasses. 
Although agricultural legislation varied in terms of method, price supports in some form 
remained a constant throughout the 1940s.  Levels of price support were minimally decreased in 
the early 1950s, but the combination of productivist agriculture leading to increased farm output 
and already mounting government grain stocks resulted in a large surplus (Bottum 1957).  In an 
attempt to combat the growing surplus problem, the concept of the ‘soil bank’ was developed.   
The Soil Bank Program (SBP), enacted in the Agricultural Act of 1956, consisted of two 
main parts.  First, the Acreage Reduction Program (ARP) portion paid producers for enrolling 
acreage on which no crop would be harvested or cattle grazed.  Between 1956 and 1958, 
approximately 21 million acres were ‘banked’ through the ARP (Cochrane and Runge 1992).  
The second part of the SBP was the first Conservation Reserve Program, which is often referred 
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to simply as the Soil Bank. This portion of the SBP paid producers for shifting below-average 
cropland into long-range conservation uses.  Producers voluntarily enrolling in the three to ten-
year land retirement program were required to maintain conservation cover on the land taken out 
of production, but producers were allowed to choose the sections of land that they enrolled in the 
Soil Bank under the SBP.  Enrollment in the Soil Bank reached 28.6 million acres in 1960 with 
the last of the enrolled acres coming out of the program in 1972 (Cochrane and Runge 1992).  
The ARP was stopped in 1958 and contracts under the Soil Bank were not actively pursued after 
1959.  According to Cochrane and Runge (1992), the reasons for abandoning the two programs 
were the high cost of removing crop acres from production, the negative impact on rural areas 
from the provision that permitted whole farms to be taken out of production, and the lack of 
success in reducing total farm output.       
A new version of the CRP was established by the Food Security Act of 1985 for the 
purpose of retiring environmentally sensitive cropland for a period of ten to fifteen years.  The 
initial focus of the program was to reduce on-site soil erosion and excess crop production.  
Throughout the early years of the program (1985-1990), concerns were expressed regarding the 
maximization of acreage as opposed to the targeting of land based on benefit-to-cost ratios.  In 
other words, the focus was on retiring as much land from production as possible rather than 
enrolling those properties that would result in the greatest environmental benefit from retirement.  
In response, the 1990 Farm Bill extended the objectives of the CRP to include on-farm and off-
farm environmental benefits.  The targeting mechanism introduced by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture was the Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) (Yang et al. 2005).  Surface water 
quality, groundwater quality, soil productivity, conservation compliance assistance, tree planting, 
acreage in critical watersheds, and acreage in conservation priority areas were equally weighted 
indicators of the EBI (Smith 2000).  In addition to the utilization of the EBI, rental payments 
were restricted to an estimate for comparable cropland after adjusting for soil productivity (Yang 
et al. 2005).  The EBI was redefined as part of the 2002 Farm Bill to include wildlife benefits, 
water quality benefits derived from reduced erosion, runoff and leaching, on-farm benefits of 
reduced erosion, enduring benefits, and air quality benefits from reduced wind erosion (FSA 
2003a)(Table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1 The Most Common & Highest Scoring Practices for CRP’s EBI (Classen et al. 
2008) 
EBI Factors Definition Features that Increase Points Maximum 
Points 
Wildlife Evaluates the 
expected  
wildlife benefits of 
the 
offer 
 Diversity of grass/legumes 
 Use of native grasses 
 Tree planting 
 Wetlands restoration 
 Beneficial to threatened/endangered species 
 Complements wetland habitat 
100 
Water 
Quality 
Evaluates the 
potential 
surface and ground  
water impacts 
 Located in ground- or surface-water protection 
area 
 Potential for percolation of chemicals and the 
local population using groundwater 
 Potential for runoff to reach surface water and 
the county population 
100 
Erosion Evaluates soil 
erodibility 
 Larger field-average erodibility index 100 
Enduring 
Benefits 
Evaluates the 
likelihood for practice 
to remain 
 Tree cover 
 Wetland restoration 
50 
Air Quality Evaluates gains from 
reduced dust 
 Potential for dust to affect people 
 Soil vulnerability to wind erosion 
 Carbon Sequestration 
45 
Cost Evaluates cost of 
parcel 
 Lower CRP rent 
 No government cost share 
 Payment is below program’s maximum 
acceptable for area and soil type 
Varies 
 
According to Yang et al. (2005), research assessing the CRP indicated that the shift to the 
EBI was helpful in increasing the cost effectiveness of the program.  However, alternate studies 
(Leathers and Harrington 2000, Wu 2000) analyzing slippage were not as optimistic regarding 
the effectiveness of the CRP, especially regarding the decrease of soil erosion. 
 
Slippage 
The phenomenon of “slippage,” as it relates to agricultural acreage reduction programs, 
can be traced back to early appraisals of the AAA in the 1930s.  As noted by Cochrane and 
Runge (1992), agricultural producers in the 1930s found ways around the crop-specific 
production control programs by renting acreage to the government then planting non-controlled 
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crops on the acreage which resulted in little to no actual reduction in production.  Although 
acreage reduction programs have changed significantly since the AAA, the concept of slippage 
remains a useful tool for estimating program effectiveness. 
There are two main types of slippage that can be analyzed when considering land 
retirement programs: acreage slippage and yield slippage.  Acreage slippage compares the total 
amount of acreage removed from production under the retirement program to the amount of land 
in production post-retirement and can be calculated in terms of total acreage in production or for 
specific crops.  Yield slippage refers to the quantity of commodities produced post-retirement of 
program lands in comparison to quantities prior to program enrollment.  Because the main intent 
of the AAA programs during the 1930s was to reduce production through the control of crop 
acreages, yield slippage was a good indicator of program effectiveness (Cochrane and Runge 
1992).  However, given the multiple-objectives of the current CRP, acreage slippage allows for a 
more holistic analysis of overall program success and is the focus of this paper.    
The occurrence of acreage slippage takes place when agricultural producers plant either 
newly cultivated land or previously fallow fields, offsetting the acreage retired under the 
program.  These producers may or may not be participants in the CRP: acreage slippage may 
occur either with substitution (of uncropped area for the acreage enrolled in a retirement 
program) or with non-enrolled farmers who expand their cultivated land (perhaps in response to 
an increase in output prices).  In the case of those who have land enrolled in the CRP, money 
saved on input costs by not cultivating the retired land combined with the CRP rental payment 
may afford them the ability to cultivate previously idle, less productive land.  In this case, so 
long as the property had been previously cultivated and a conservation plan developed, Farm Bill 
provisions provide no means of penalty for these actions.  Producers without land enrolled in the 
CRP may begin to cultivate new ground or less productive fields in anticipation of higher 
commodity output prices that may result from a reduction in area production due to land 
retirement.  Producers involved in other government programs, such as crop insurance or farm 
loans, they still required to have a conservation plan in place if the land is considered highly 
erodible.  They also are forbidden from plowing up previously uncultivated grasslands under the 
Conservation Compliance and Sodbuster provisions of the 1985 Farm Bill.  However, those 
producers not involved in government programs are able to cultivate any and all land under their 
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control because the penalties associated with Farm Bill provisions are limited to the denial of 
access to all federal agriculture assistance programs. 
Ideally, the number of acres in production would be directly reduced by the number of 
acres retired under the CRP.  In reality, acreage reduction programs generally only reduce total 
crop acreage by a percentage of that which is removed from production by program enrollment 
(Ericksen and Collins 1985).  The resulting offset due to increased plantings on unrestricted 
acres is slippage and is measured as a factor from zero to one.  A slippage factor of zero indicates 
that for every acre removed from production, total acreage in production is reduced by one acre.  
In other words, program retirements have been completely effective.  Likewise, a slippage factor 
of one means that total production was not at all reduced by the program acreage being removed 
from production.        
 
Economic Impacts of CRP 
The concept of equity among producers enrolling land in the CRP has been a major issue.  
The broad problem arose from a uniform bid cap within a region where individual parcel 
productivity may greatly differ.  The results were a greater burden on those producers with 
highly productive land who wished to enroll a portion of their land in the CRP than those 
enrolling less productive land in the program (Young et al. 1991).  Revisions in the 2002 Farm 
Bill addressed these concerns by setting bid maximums based on county-level average cropland 
rental rates and adjusting these rates for field-specific productivity. 
Although there is a 25 percent cap on the amount of land that can be enrolled in the CRP 
within each county, the impact on the local economy from taking this land out of agricultural 
production is still an issue of concern.  As noted by Martin et al. (1988), “while individual 
farmers may benefit from participation, there may be [a] net adverse impact on the community if 
the retired land is relatively productive or if the inputs that are no longer purchased would have 
been purchased locally”.  The negative impacts on the local economy can be further compounded 
if the monetary CRP benefits are going to a landowner who no longer resides in the area (Martin 
et al. 1988).  Revisions within the 2008 Farm Bill address this issue by giving preference to 
locally-residing producers over absentee landowners for program enrollment, all other criteria 
being equal.  In rural areas where the CRP reaches the 25 percent per county enrollment level, 
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the local decrease in demand for farm inputs can have a major impact.  Couple this with 
commonly occurring depopulation of these areas, and it is even more challenging for local 
suppliers to stay in business.   
Enrollment in the CRP does affect the supply of agricultural commodities, making it a 
useful tool for the reduction of excess crop production (Taff 1990).  However, this would only 
hold true for those counties where any reduction in crop production is not offset by slippage.  In 
turn, the decrease in commodity supply may increase commodity prices, adjusting the 
relationship between potential production income from the land and income gained through 
enrollment in the CRP.  This can lead to increased slippage in regard to the program and 
decreased re-enrollment upon completion of program contracts.         
As previously mentioned, the CRP was criticized early on for attempting to maximize 
acreage enrolled in the program.  Although Congress mandated that the CRP be run as an auction 
with the hopes that this would provide incentive for landowners to submit bid prices that 
reflected the land’s true rental values, difficulties with the initial implementation of the program 
(1985-1990) transformed it into an “offer system” where anyone with eligible land could enroll 
and be paid at the bid cap price (Smith 1995).  This raised some questions regarding the size of 
the CRP relative to the amount that was being spent on the program.  Essentially, what critics 
were saying is that with this method, the costs of the program outweighed the benefits (marginal 
cost was higher than marginal benefit).  In an attempt to decrease marginal cost relative to 
marginal benefit, rather than decrease the size of the program, determination of land eligibility 
for enrollment in the CRP was based on the Environmental Benefits Index and program 
payments were based on an estimate of production capability on the enrolled lands.       
Land enrolled in the CRP is privately owned; however, with enrollment in the program 
comes certain rules and regulations regarding the use of not only the land enrolled, but also all 
other land owned by the agricultural producer.  The Sodbuster, Swampbuster, and Conservation 
Compliance provisions included in the Food Security Act of 1985 require that no previously 
uncultivated ground is put into production and that all land in production meets appropriate 
conservation practices.  Failure to comply with these provisions can result in the loss of 
eligibility for certain farm program benefits if it is determined that the producer was not acting in 
‘good faith’.  This would seem to be a large enough penalty to deter violation of the rules.  
However, confirmation of compliance with these provisions has proven difficult, given the vast 
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spatial extent of CRP lands (Wu 2000).  Increasing agricultural commodity prices also provide 
economic incentive for the violation of these provisions. 
Assuming that slippage does not surpass the benefits of the program, agricultural land 
retirement through the CRP reduces the external costs of farming.  These externalities occur 
where producers do not incur the full cost of their actions.  Examples of externalities associated 
with agricultural production include soil erosion and fertilizer runoff which pollute both surface 
water and groundwater, emissions from the use of fossil fuels for production purposes, the 
release of carbon from tilling the soil which leads to air pollution, and in certain areas substantial 
depletion of groundwater supply through irrigation.  Removing land from production effectively 
reduces these externalities. 
Because producer decisions to enroll in the CRP may cause the price of agricultural 
commodities to increase, due to a decrease in production and available quantities, it can also be 
said that the program has an external economy for other producers.  External benefits may exist 
in the form of decreased pollution for those downstream from land enrolled in the CRP.  Again, 
as long as the environmental benefits gained from those lands enrolled in the CRP are not offset 
by slippage, the improved water quality could be considered an external benefit for those 
downstream from the property. 
With increasing prices of agricultural commodities and many CRP contracts set to expire, 
a major issue with current CRP policy is that of rental rates and the extension of CRP land 
contracts.  A study (Cooper and Osborn 1998) conducted around the time of the last large 
contract expiration found that, given the then-current averages for CRP rental payments, only 50 
percent of enrolled landowners would be likely to extend their contracts.  Given such indications, 
it will be interesting to see what impact recent commodity prices will have on landowner 
decisions to re-enroll in the CRP.  The ability to profit additionally from the harvest of biomass 
for biofuel production on CRP land and permitted haying or grazing (with payment reductions as 
outlined in the 2008 Farm Bill) may play a crucial role in these decisions. 
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CHAPTER 3 - Study Area 
According to the Kansas Energy Plan (2007), approximately 94 percent (49.2 million 
acres) of Kansas land is used for agricultural production and wildlife habitat.  As calculated from 
crop statistics reported by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), row crop 
production accounts for approximately 20.8 million of these acres (1995-2005 average).  In 
comparison to this, the 3.1 million acres of land currently enrolled in the CRP within the state 
seems rather minuscule.  However, as the largest cropland retirement program to date, those 
acres retired under the CRP are a crucial part of ongoing attempts to decrease the environmental 
degradation that results from agricultural production on marginally suitable lands.  Kansas has 
the third highest total acreage enrolled in the CRP, slightly trailing Montana (3.2 million acres) 
and Texas (3.8 million acres) (FSA 2009).  Although it may rank third in total acreage, when 
enrolled acreage is considered with respect to total land area among these three states, Kansas 
comes out on top with approximately 5.9 percent of total land area enrolled in the CRP (Montana 
3.4 percent; Texas 2.3 percent).   
The state of Kansas represents an area with a high degree of spatial variability in crop 
production, and methods of production, due to a spatially disparate precipitation pattern, regional 
differences in access to and need for irrigation, and heavily weighted population centers within 
the eastern third of the state that results in differing land ownership patterns.  Given the state’s 
emphasis on agricultural production, the regional variability in production, and the large acreage 
enrolled in the CRP, Kansas lends itself well to the analysis of CRP slippage and the 
determinants thereof.          
 
Agriculture in Kansas 
There are four main crops under production within the state of Kansas: wheat, sorghum, 
corn, and soybeans.  Wheat accounts for approximately 50.25 percent of total row crop planting 
within the state (percentages based on total planted acreage averages from 1995-2005).  
Regionally, wheat is fairly evenly dispersed throughout the western two-thirds of the state, with 
some notable concentrations in the south-central area (Figure 3.1).  Sorghum is the second most 
common crop, representing approximately 17.2 percent of total row crop planting.  As with 
wheat, sorghum is common throughout Kansas, but is more concentrated in the south-central, 
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north-central and southwestern portions of the state (Figure 3.2).  Corn is slightly less common 
than sorghum, at 14.5 percent of total crop acreage.  Corn is also less spatially dispersed than 
wheat and sorghum, with large concentrations of planted corn in the southwestern and 
northwestern areas and some minor concentration in the extreme northeast (Figure 3.3).  
Soybeans are approximately 12.5 percent of total planted row crops.  As seen in Figure 3.4, 
soybeans are primarily grown in the eastern one-third of the state, an area with lower numbers of 
the top three grain crops in comparison to the rest of the state.  This is due primarily to 
calcareous soils in the central and western portions of the state and the common resulting 
problem of iron chlorosis in soybeans (AESCES 1997).  Alternative crops such as sunflowers, 
upland cotton, and dry edible beans make-up the remaining 5.5 percent of total crops. 
 
Figure 3.1 Wheat: Average Planted Acreage as a Proportion of State Total (1995-2005) 
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Figure 3.2 Sorghum: Average Planted Acreage as a Proportion of State Total (1995-2005) 
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Figure 3.3 Corn: Average Planted Acreage as a Proportion of State Total (1995-2005) 
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Figure 3.4 Soybeans: Average Planted Acreage as a Proportion of State Total (1995-2005) 
 
 
Annual precipitation varies across the state, decreasing in an east-to-west gradient (Figure 
3.5).  Not surprisingly, the use of irrigation reflects the lack of rainfall in the western two-thirds 
of the state and is compounded in the southwestern region by the concentrated planting of corn, a 
crop with a high requisite for water (Figure 3.6).  The primary source of water for irrigation in 
this High Plains area is the vast Ogallala Aquifer.  The availability of affordable technology to 
tap this resource after World War II (Kromm and White 1992) changed this portion of the state 
from a drought stricken area of low production to one of the most agriculturally productive areas 
in the state (Peterson et al. 2003).  Unfortunately, the high use and slow recharge of aquifer 
waters has led to dramatic decreases in the level of the water table and there are now areas where 
it is no longer economically feasible to access the water for irrigating crops.   
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Figure 3.5 Precipitation: Normal County Annual Totals 
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Figure 3.6 Agricultural Statistics Districts: Irrigated Cropland Average (1995-2005) 
 
Population densities in eastern Kansas are much higher than the rest of the state.  
Historically, large settlements within the state were located along the Kansas River, its 
tributaries, and the Arkansas River (Self and White 1986).  The combination of a high population 
density and less open terrain has resulted in smaller farm units in the eastern third of the state.  In 
comparison, the wide-open expanses of the high plains region in the west has lent itself well to 
the development of very large, often corporate, farms. 
 
Conservation Reserve Program in Kansas 
Total enrollment in the CRP varied throughout the study period (1995-2005), with lows 
of approximately 2.5 million in 1999 and 2000 (Figure 3.7).  Of the 3.1 million acres in Kansas 
that are currently enrolled in the CRP, approximately 2.6 million acres are located in the western 
two-thirds of the state (Figure 3.8).  Interestingly, despite the large spatial difference in 
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contracted acreage, the number of CRP contracts is fairly evenly distributed throughout the state.  
The reason for the spatially disparate CRP acreage is a combination of land ownership patterns, 
terrain, soil types, and the conservation practices that are most widely used in different regions of 
the state.  Many CRP practices in the eastern portion of the state enroll buffers and filter strips 
rather than the large expanses of grassland that are seen in central and western Kansas. 
 
Figure 3.7 Total Annual CRP Enrollment in Kansas (1995-2005) 
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Figure 3.8 CRP Distribution in Kansas (March 2009) 
 
 
Currently, within the CRP there are 38 Conservation Practices (CP), ranging from the 
planting of native grasses to the construction of erosion control structures along stream banks.  
This total excludes further breakdowns within each practice such as Tree Planting (CP3) and 
Hardwood Tree Planting (CP3A).  The most common Conservation Practices in Kansas (Table 
3.1) are Vegetative Cover–Grass–Already Established (CP10), Establishment of Permanent 
Native Grasses (CP2), Restoration and Management of Declining Habitat (CP25), Filter Strips 
(CP21), and Habitat Buffers for Upland Wildlife (CP33).  Combined, these account for 
approximately 97.8 percent of all acres enrolled in the state.  
The difference in land ownership patterns and Conservation Practices between the eastern one-
third and western two-thirds of the state is evident when the contract data are broken down.  
While CP10 is the most common practice in both regions, it makes up only 25 percent of total 
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contracts in the east and nearly 40 percent of contracts in the west.  The average tract size of the 
CP10 contracts also differs regionally, with an average of 18.9 acres in the east and 56.5 acres in 
the west.  Another major difference is the use of filter strips (CP21).  In the eastern one-third of 
the state, CP21 is the second most common practice, accounting for nearly 25 percent of 
contracts and averaging only 2.4 acres per tract.  In the central and western portions of the state, 
CP21 totals only 3 percent of all contracts. 
 
Table 3.1 Top Five CRP Conservation Practices in Kansas (FSA 2003b) 
Conservation
Practice 
(CP) 
Practice Purpose Percent of Total Acres Enrolled 
10 Vegetative Cover – 
Grass – Already 
Established 
 Reduce soil erosion & sedimentation 
 Improve water quality 
 Enhance wildlife habitat 
52.3 
2 Establishment of 
Permanent Native 
Grasses 
 Restore a plant community similar to its 
historic climax or the desired plant 
community 
 Provide or improve forages for livestock 
 Provide or improve forage, browse or cover 
for wildlife 
 Reduce erosion by wind and/or water 
 Improve water quality & quantity 
27.6 
25 Restoration & 
Management of 
Declining Habitat 
 Restore land or aquatic habitats degraded by 
human activity 
 Provide habitat for rare & declining wildlife 
species by restoring & conserving native 
plant communities 
 Increase native plant community diversity 
 Manage unique or declining native habitats 
15.9 
21 Filter Strips  Reduce sediment, particulate organics, and 
sediment adsorbed contaminate loadings in 
runoff & surface irrigation tailwater 
 Reduce dissolved contaminate loadings in 
runoff 
 Restore, create or enhance herbaceous 
habitat for wildlife & beneficial insects 
 Maintain or enhance watershed functions & 
values 
1.0 
33 Habitat Buffers for 
Upland Wildlife 
 Create corridors for wildlife movement 
 Provide wildlife food 
 Provide nesting, brood & winter cover 
 Provide habitat for beneficial insects 
 Reduce erosion & improve water quality 
1.0 
  Total: 97.8 
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CHAPTER 4 - Literature Review 
 In an attempt to gain a more holistic view of the recent research pertaining to the CRP, 
my literature review ranges outside the scope of those studies specific to the topic of CRP 
slippage.  As a multiple objective program, it is important to include this research to gain a better 
understanding of how alternate studies view the benefits of the CRP.  
 
Slippage 
Early research regarding the phenomenon of slippage as it related to acreage reduction 
programs included that of Ericksen and Collins (1985).  While this research pertained to 
programs predating the current CRP, the premise and methods utilized for calculating slippage 
rates are similar.  The major difference is in the goals of the acreage reduction programs.  The 
CRP was the first acreage reduction program to place much importance on the reduction of soil 
erosion.  Prior to the CRP, the major focus of acreage reduction programs was to control crop 
production and increase agricultural commodity prices.  Ericksen and Collins (1985) analyzed 
the effectiveness of acreage reduction programs at actually reducing total crop supply.  By 
comparing the annual change in harvested acreage with the change in acreage idled through 
reduction programs in the United States, they were able to calculate annual slippage rates.  Their 
results led them to conclude that these early acreage reduction programs were inefficient at 
reducing crop supplies because of increased plantings on unrestricted acres and a reduction in the 
impact from idling lower yielding lands. 
Previous research regarding slippage in the CRP has varied in both the spatial extent of 
the study area and the approach or methods used for the analysis.  Leathers and Harrington 
(2000) focused specifically on the issue of land slippage in the 14-county area of Southwestern 
Kansas from 1988 to 1994.  Because acreage was also enrolled in both the Acreage Conservation 
Reserve (ACR) and the Conservation Use for Pay program (CUPAY) during the study period, 
the annual conservation acreage totals included those acreages and that of the CRP.  Using 
agricultural statistics, slippage rates were calculated at the county level for each year in the study 
period and remotely sensed data was analyzed for a refined study area.  Slippage rates varied 
from one county to the next, with some counties showing more year to year variability.  Overall 
 23
results indicated that slippage in Southwestern Kansas greatly reduced the effectiveness of the 
CRP at decreasing soil erosion. 
A similar study conducted by Wu (2000), analyzed the slippage effect on a much larger 
12 state region in the central U.S.  The study outlined the ways in which both substitution and 
output price increase can bring fallow or unbroken land into production.  Data for the slippage 
analysis were acquired from the 1982 and 1992 National Resource Inventories produced by the 
Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) and county-level CRP summary data from the 
Economic Research Service (ERS).  A multivariate regression model was used to examine the 
impact of the CRP on the acreage of non-cropland converted to cropland.  The dependant 
variable was acreage of non-cropland converted to cropland between 1982 and 1992 as a 
proportion of the total land area in each agricultural statistical unit.  Independent variables 
included acres of cropland enrolled in CRP by 1992 and other characteristics, such as farm size 
and population.  The variables included in the regression explained 45 percent of the variation in 
the converted cropland acreage according to the analysis.  The study concluded that substantial 
slippage effects were present in the CRP and, more specifically, that for each 100 acres of land 
retired under the CRP in the central U.S., 20 acres of non-cropland were converted to cropland. 
 
Soil Quality and Erosion 
The National Research Council’s (1993) analysis of agricultural impacts on soil and 
water quality stated that “protecting soil quality, like protecting air and water quality should be a 
fundamental goal of national policy” (p. 18).  Soil quality not only affects the productivity of the 
land, but is also connected to the physical condition of other resources including air, water, 
plants, and animals (Mausbach 1996).  According to a study conducted by Pimental et al. (1995), 
approximately 90 percent of cropland in the U.S. is losing soil at what is considered to be above 
a sustainable rate. 
Realizing that CRP contracts are not all continuously enrolled, a study by Gilley and 
Doran (1997) in Northern Mississippi attempted to determine the post-enrollment soil erosion 
potential of CRP land once it was returned to cropland.  Soil erosion rates were known for the 
test field prior to enrollment and were compared to erosion rates after the one-time CRP field had 
been tilled and left fallow for nine months.  The results indicated that soil erosion rates prior to 
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enrollment in the CRP were very similar to erosion rates after the conservation cover had been 
tilled. 
  Baer et al. (2000) constructed a study to determine the impacts of the CRP on soil 
quality in terms of carbon and nitrogen content.  They examined the soil quality from samples 
obtained at a depth of 2 to 4 inches from fields recently converted from agricultural production to 
native perennial grasses through the CRP, fields that had been in the CRP for a period of ten 
years, and fields of native prairie.  While both of the CRP samples were lower in terms of total 
carbon and nitrogen pools in comparison to the native prairie, the long-term (ten year) samples 
did show significant increases.  Based on the results and comparisons of the analyzed soil 
samples, the authors concluded that the CRP does promote soil restoration; however ten years is 
not a sufficient timeframe for restoring soils to pre-cultivation quality levels.  
 
Water Quality 
Khanna et al. (2003) indicated that the growing concern over the negative impacts of 
agricultural activities on water quality has changed the focus of land retirement programs from 
reducing on-site soil erosion to reducing damages to water bodies caused by sediment and 
chemical runoff.  This shift in priorities is indicated by the introduction of the Conservation 
Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) as a modification to the CRP.  This study attempted to 
identify areas in Illinois where implementation of the CREP would be most effective at meeting 
the state’s environmental goals regarding the reduction of sediment and nutrient loadings.  The 
study used an integrated framework to combine both spatial and biophysical attributes of land 
within the sample watershed with a hydrological and an economic model.  Not surprisingly, the 
results indicated that croplands that are highly sloping and adjacent to water bodies should be 
selected for retirement.  The more interesting portion of the results resulted from the inclusion of 
the economic model, which indicated that a marginal value rental payment scheme would 
achieve the program goals at a lower cost than a productivity-based rental scheme.      
Lovell and Sullivan (2006) analyzed the effects of conservation buffers and then looked 
at the relationship between buffers and the CRP.  It is noted that conservation buffers are 
extremely positive for the ecological health of rural landscapes, decreasing soil erosion and 
increasing water quality.  Water quality benefits associated with buffers include reduced 
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sediment loading from runoff and decreased leaching of agricultural chemicals and fertilizers.  
Because of the perceived value of buffers, the authors note, the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
is committed to increasing buffer adoption through the CRP, which is the primary program for 
funding buffers in the U.S.  However, U.S. policy makers have not fully embraced the idea of 
conservation buffers.  Recommendations that resulted from this study included modifying 
policies to better reflect the preferences of landowners and society, a multi-disciplinary study of 
buffer systems at the watershed scale, and designing buffers that consider aesthetic preferences 
and for varying locations.    
 
Wildlife Benefits 
Due to the fact that approximately 70 percent of land in the lower 48 states of the U.S. is 
in private ownership, land retirement programs are very important to the conservation of fish and 
wildlife (Burger 2006, Gray and Teels 2006).  Although soil conservation was the original focus 
of CRP contracts, the perennial vegetation planted also provided habitat for wildlife (Gray and 
Teels 2006).  The increased environmental emphasis of CRP enrollment requirements, as 
indicated by the switch to the EBI, reflects the importance of reserve programs on wildlife 
habitat, and so do the many studies that document the benefits of habitat improvement.  These 
studies range from specific impacts of reserve lands on a single species, to overall effects of 
conservation lands on biodiversity. 
Fields et al. (2006) studied the impact of CRP lands on the nesting and brood survival of 
the lesser prairie-chicken in west-central Kansas.  The study determined that the probability of 
nest survival was best determined by the age of the nest and brood, timing during the season, age 
of the brooding female, and precipitation during the brooding period.  Although location of nests 
and broods were considered, the fact that some nesting/brooding sites were located on CRP lands 
was not determined to be a significant factor in determining survival rates.  In other words, there 
appeared to be no benefit to those nesting/brooding sites that were located on CRP lands during 
this study period. 
A study by Kamler et al. (2004) compared the home ranges and seasonal habitat of 
coyotes in northwestern Texas on native prairie, farmland, and CRP land, in an attempt to 
determine impacts of CRP on populations and ranges.  The study indicated that CRP fields do 
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provide important cover for coyotes, however the authors emphasize that CRP lands were the 
only tall permanent vegetation in their study area.  Coyotes were divided into two distinct 
groups, residents and transients, and the impacts of the different cover types were measured for 
either group.  The research showed the importance of CRP habitat as areas for resident coyote 
dens and foraging habitat for transients.  The methodological approach for this study did not 
allow for the measurement of possible carrying capacity increases on CRP lands; however, the 
authors noted the likelihood of an increased capacity based on the high use of CRP areas by both 
groups of coyotes. 
   A study conducted by Cunningham (2005), attempted to compare the relative benefit 
for grassland songbirds of public grasslands maintained as habitat in the Midwestern U.S. with 
private land that was retired in the CRP.  Her study area was in southern Minnesota, where bird 
survey data from CRP fields and public lands were gathered.  She then ran an assessment of 
fragmentation utilizing GIS.  Results indicated that native songbird abundance and diversity 
were greater on CRP lands.  The cause of this appears to be the vegetation composition, with 
more dense grasslands on CRP lands than on public lands.  The author attributes this to funding 
differences, and notes that temporal variation of CRP lands could have a strong influence on the 
success or failure of biodiversity conservation in this region. 
Klute, Robel, and Kemp (1997) addressed the issue of non-reenrollment of CRP lands 
and the associated impact on grassland birds in Kansas.  The timing of this study was based on 
the fact that unless renewed, many CRP contracts were set to expire in 1997.  The study 
indicated that up to 70 percent of land in Kansas that was not re-enrolled would be converted to 
pasture.  The study therefore compared the avian use of CRP areas with that of pastures in order 
to determine if the conversion of CRP to pasture would negatively impact grassland birds.  The 
authors found that CRP lands in the study area had less dense vegetation than pastureland during 
portions of the year, although vegetation on CRP lands was taller late in the summer.  Total 
avian abundance was greater in pastures than in CRP fields.  As such, it was concluded that the 
conversion from CRP to pasture in Kansas would not be detrimental to grassland bird 
populations if the land were moderately grazed.   
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CHAPTER 5 - Methods 
Because crop reports are made annually at the county level, my analysis was conducted 
based on these spatial units, rather than ecological units such as watersheds.  The slippage 
calculations are based partly on the county crop figures as made available through the USDA 
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS).  Through this source, annual acreage totals for 
both planted and harvested crops were compiled for all 105 counties in Kansas.  A state level 
branch of the NASS, the Kansas Agricultural Statistics Service (KASS), provided the source for 
historical reports regarding average annual prices paid for the four main grain crops (wheat, 
sorghum, corn, and soybeans) and average annual land values for irrigated, dry-land, and 
pastureland.  Finally, regional annual production costs were obtained from the USDA Economic 
Research Service (ERS) for each of the four main grain crops.  These production costs include 
average annual prices (in dollars) paid for seed, fertilizer, custom operations, and energy inputs 
per planted acre for each crop. 
The study period of 1995-2005 was chosen for several reasons.  First, during this 
timeframe the CRP accounted for the overwhelming majority of land in retirement programs 
within the state of Kansas.  Second, restrictions in data availability for one or more of the 
independent variables limited the length to this eleven year period.  Finally, the period of 1995-
2005 contains significant variations in regard to output prices paid and input costs for 
agricultural commodities. 
  
Slippage Calculations 
The method used for slippage calculations is the same as that which was employed by 
Leathers and Harrington (2000) when analyzing the effectiveness of the CRP in reducing soil 
erosion in a 14 county area of southwestern Kansas.  Calculations are based on county level 
agricultural statistics and land retirement program enrollment numbers using the following 
equation: 
S = {1.0 – [(A – A*) / L]} x 100, 
where S is the slippage factor, A is the acreage that would be in production without CRP, A* is 
the actual acreage of crops, and L is the acreage enrolled in the CRP. 
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 In determining the acreage that would be in production without the CRP (A), several 
factors must be considered.  Leathers and Harrington (2000) used the average number of acres 
harvested in 1980, 1981, and 1982, rather than the three year period immediately prior to the 
CRP, because there was no land retired through alternate acreage diversion programs in 1980 
and 1981 and very few acres retired in 1982.  For this same reason, I have chosen to use this time 
period in determining the county level base acreage for slippage calculations in my study.  Using 
this time period does introduce a potential source of error.  If the total acreage in production was 
increasing post-1982, then the base acreage (A) would be too low causing inflation in the 
calculated slippage rates.  An analysis of district level total cropland figures, gathered from the 
USDA NASS Census of Agriculture (1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002), shows the total acreage for 
1982 as equal to or higher than the total acreage for 1997 and 2002 for all districts (Figure 5.1; 
see also Figure 3.6).  This lower total cropland acreage cannot be attributed to the introduction of 
the CRP as the Census of Agriculture includes reserve program lands as idled cropland in 
determining this figure.  Therefore, using the average acreage in production from 1980-1982 as 
the base acreage for each county should not produce any significant inflation in the slippage 
calculations. 
 
Figure 5.1 Agricultural Census: Total Cropland in Production by District 
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An additional possible source of error worth noting is the agricultural practice of double-
cropping.  Double-cropping occurs when two different crops are grown on the same acreage 
during a growing season.  Unfortunately, acreage figures for this practice are not available at any 
scale for the state of Kansas.  Because of the lack of available data, a method must be developed 
in an attempt to overcome the possibility of overestimating acreage in production due to this 
practice.  Leathers and Harrington (2000) used the total acreage harvested rather than the total 
acreage planted in an attempt to remove the impact of double-cropping on reported acreage in 
production.  I have found that the impact of poor harvest years introduces a significant amount of 
undue variation on slippage calculations.  To decrease the impact of poor crop years I calculated 
a 25 year (1980-2004) average of the proportion of planted crops that were harvested for each 
county.  The total reported planted acreage for each county was then multiplied by the 25 year 
average percentage harvested for each year in the study (1980-1982 and 1995-2005); the results 
were used for both the acreage in production without CRP (A) and the actual acreage of crops 
(A*), effectively removing the influence of extremely poor harvest years while still accounting 
for the practice of double-cropping.  While this method may help to curb the inflation of slippage 
calculations created by overestimation of actual acreage in production, some inflation may still 
exist.   
As traditional crop rotation methods have given way to continuous cropping practices 
fueled by the increased use of fertilizers, overestimation of actual acreage in production is a 
difficult obstacle to overcome without the availability of more detailed data regarding the 
practices taking place on the reported acreage.  Another area where the lack of detailed data may 
impact the accuracy of total acreage in production estimations is the scale at which individual 
crops are reported on annually.  Due to privacy concerns, NASS often combines counties when 
reporting totals for alternative crops within Kansas such as oats, rye, and barley.  Because of this, 
it is impossible to gather county level data for all crops that are planted within each county on an 
annual basis.  However, these alternative crops together only account for an average of 
approximately 5.5 percent of statewide total planted crops within the study period (1995-2005).  
The lack of these crops in all figures for total actual planted acres (A*) annually should not 
significantly impact the accuracy of slippage calculations and may help to mitigate any 
overestimation of actual planted acreage.   
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Figures for Ford County can be used as an example of how the slippage rates are 
calculated: in 1980-1982, after adjusting for the 25 year (1980-2004) average proportion of 
planted crop acreage that was harvested (89.91 percent), an average of 317,534 acres were in 
production.  In 1995, after making the adjustment (average harvesting of 89.91 percent of 
planted acreage), 314,327 acres were under cultivation and 49,318 acres were enrolled in the 
CRP.  Slippage for 1995 equaled: 1 - [(317,534 - 314,327)/49,318], or 0.935.  In other words, for 
every 100 acres enrolled in the CRP, only 6.5 acres were taken out of production; the remaining 
93.5 percent were slipped acres.    
 
Agricultural Commodity Pricing & Costs 
Due to the lack of available county level data regarding annual prices paid for agricultural 
commodities, these data had to be gathered at the district level.  NASS and KASS divide the 
state of Kansas into nine statistical district that each include anywhere from eight to fourteen 
counties.  The divisions are labeled as Northwest, West-Central, Southwest, North-Central, 
Central, South-Central, Northeast, East-Central, and Southeast.  The data sets that were collected 
from the district level KASS historical reports include the average annual price paid per bushel 
for wheat, sorghum, corn, and soybeans, and the average annual land values for irrigated 
cropland, non-irrigated cropland, and pastureland.  Variations in annual average prices paid for 
the four main grain crops were very slight among districts through the study period (Figures 5.2, 
5.3, 5.4, 5.5), with highs and lows generally occurring in the same years for all crops.  Because 
of the district-level similarities among reported prices paid, any spatial relationships that may 
exist between CRP acreage slippage and agricultural commodity output prices are not easily 
observed.  Given the high degree of spatial variability for the average CRP slippage rates, further 
analysis regarding annual variation in output prices and slippage rates within each district (rather 
than across districts) may be beneficial. 
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Figure 5.2 Wheat: Average Annual Prices Paid by District (1995-2005) 
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Figure 5.3 Sorghum: Average Annual Prices Paid by District (1995-2005) 
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Figure 5.4 Corn: Average Annual Prices Paid by District (1995-2005) 
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Figure 5.5 Soybeans: Average Annual Prices Paid by District (1995-2005) 
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Because no data are available at the county, district, or state level, I was forced to include 
agricultural input costs based on data from a larger area.  The USDA ERS produces historical 
reports on commodity costs and returns at the regional level.  While this is not ideal, the data 
should be sufficient given the lack of intrastate variation in average input costs.  However, 
comparing regional scale data to county level CRP slippage rates may be troublesome for 
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statistical analysis, introducing a high degree of correlation between predictor variables.  The 
region used is termed the Prairie Gateway by the ERS, and includes all of Kansas, southern 
Nebraska, eastern Colorado and New Mexico, western Oklahoma, and all of Central Texas.  The 
data collected from these reports includes the average cost per planted acre for wheat, sorghum, 
corn, and soybeans, including costs for seed, fertilizer, custom operations (planting and 
harvesting), and energy inputs (fuel, lube, and electricity).   This annually compiled data set uses 
a sampling method from which estimates of the regional averages are derived.   
 
Statistical Analysis 
Using the annual slippage calculations as my response variable, a multivariate linear step-
wise regression analysis was used to examine the relationships between CRP slippage and 
agricultural commodity output prices and input costs (Table 5.1).  The software utilized in  
 
Table 5.1 Regression Analysis Variables and Predicted Relationships 
Response Variable Predictor Variables 
CRP Slippage 
 Price Paid per Bushel Wheat (+) 
 Price Paid per Bushel Sorghum (+) 
 Price Paid per Bushel Corn (+) 
 Price Paid per Bushel Soybeans (+) 
 Irrigated Cropland Value (-) 
 Non-Irrigated Cropland Value (-) 
 Pastureland Value (-) 
 Cost per Planted Acre Wheat Seed (-) 
 Cost per Planted Acre Wheat Fertilizer (-) 
 Cost per Planted Acre Wheat Custom Ops. (-) 
 Cost per Planted Acre Wheat Energy Inputs (-) 
 Cost per Planted Acre Sorghum Seed (-) 
 Cost per Planted Acre Sorghum Fertilizer (-) 
 Cost per Planted Acre Sorghum Custom Ops. (-) 
 Cost per Planted Acre Sorghum Energy Inputs (-) 
 Cost per Planted Acre Corn Seed (-) 
 Cost per Planted Acre Corn Fertilizer (-) 
 Cost per Planted Acre Corn Custom Ops. (-) 
 Cost per Planted Acre Corn Energy Inputs (-) 
 Cost per Planted Acre Soybean Seed (-) 
 Cost per Planted Acre Soybean Fertilizer (-) 
 Cost per Planted Acre Soybean Custom Ops. (-) 
 Cost per Planted Acre Soybean Energy Inputs (-) 
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completing this task was Minitab 15.  As is the case with most statistical tests, a quality 
regression analysis relies upon certain assumptions regarding the variables being used.  As noted 
by Schroeder et al. (1986), the main assumptions of multiple regression that should always be 
tested include linearity, homoscedasticity, and normality.  Therefore, my initial analysis includes 
the evaluation of the datasets in regard to these assumptions (see Chapter 6).   
 The predicted positive and negative relationships depicted in Table 5.1 are based on the 
assumption that as prices paid for agricultural commodities increase, a monetary incentive exists 
to plant additional acreage.  Likewise, as input costs rise, a monetary disincentive should reduce 
the planting of additional acreage.  These assumptions are based on a static setting and do not 
account for the dynamics of the variable agricultural markets where increases in input costs may 
be offset by increases in the prices paid for commodities; lags between price shifts and 
CRP/slippage decisions are possible, but this research does not attempt to make time 
adjustments.  A model attempting to account for these variables would be very complex and is 
well outside the scope of this project. 
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CHAPTER 6 - Results 
Slippage Results 
The county level annual slippage calculations and following refinement of the study area 
provides an interesting spatial pattern of slippage rates across Kansas (Figure 6.1).  While the 
vast majority of counties within the eastern one-third of the state have no slippage (often 
negative) in regards to the CRP, nearly every county in the western two-thirds has a positive 
average slippage rate for the study period.  As discussed in chapter 3, I would speculate that this 
spatial disparity in slippage rates is primarily due to the difference in land ownership patterns  
 
Figure 6.1 Average Annual Slippage for the Study Period (1995-2005) 
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and lack of unutilized farm ground in the more populated eastern portion of the state.  The 
exclusion of the eastern counties with no slippage may have a significant impact on independent 
variables such as soybean production costs, as soybeans are primarily planted within the eastern 
one-third of the state. 
 Complete results from the slippage calculations are provided in Appendix A.  District 
level annual averages are presented in graphic format to allow for regional comparison in 
average slippage rates prior to study area refinement (Figures 6.2).  As would be expected based 
on the average county level slippage rates for the study period (Figure 6.1), the highest average 
slippage rates occur in the northwestern district, topping out at just over 350 percent in 2000.  
Likewise, the lowest average slippage rates were located in the southeastern district with a low of 
approximately -788 percent in 1999.  For the northeastern and east-central districts, the extreme 
slippage values for Wyandotte and Johnson County (highly urban areas) were removed from the 
calculations for average annual slippage.  The negative slippage values for some years in the  
 
Figure 6.2 Annual Slippage Rates by District (1995-2005) 
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central and south-central districts, and nearly all years in the three easternmost districts, indicate 
a loss in cropland in production beyond the acreage enrolled in the CRP.  Although alternative 
land retirement programs are available within the state, the low total acreage enrolled in these 
programs could not possibly account for these figures.  Given the concentration of urban 
populations within the majority of the districts with negative average annual slippage rates, a 
future analysis regarding the impacts of urban sprawl as it relates to CRP slippage may be 
beneficial. 
 
Regression Analysis Results 
Scatterplots, including regression lines, were produced for each predictor variable 
independently against slippage rates (Appendix B).  The evident lack of significant correlation 
between the predictor variables and response variable was not promising.  However, there was 
no evidence of any curvilinear relationships and the fitted regression lines indicated slight 
positive and negative relationships with some independent variables.      
Initial analysis of normal probability plots, graphing the standardized residuals against 
their expected values, indicated non-normality to some degree for all variables.  In an attempt to 
normalize the data, reducing the probability of Type I and Type II errors, outliers were removed 
from the dataset.  With the outliers removed, the regression analysis was run (alpha = 0.05) and a 
second analysis of assumptions conducted.  While the probability plot showed improvement with 
regards to normality, both negative and positive skewness was still present (Figure 6.11).  
According to Schroeder et al. (1986), moderate departures from normality do not seriously affect 
results for data with a large number of observations.  Based on 11 years and 65 counties, 715 
observations were initially used for analysis.  167 outliers were removed for further statistical 
analyses.  The majority of outliers that were removed came from the northwestern and eastern 
districts where the most extreme highs and lows in county slippage calculations were located.  
Given my sample size of 548 observations after the removal of outliers, I proceeded knowing 
that some non-normality might still exist.   
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Figure 6.3 Residual Plots for Regression Analysis 
420-2-4
99.99
99
90
50
10
1
0.01
Standardized Residual
P
er
ce
nt
1.51.00.50.0
2
1
0
-1
-2
Fitted Value
St
an
da
rd
iz
ed
 R
es
id
ua
l
2.251.500.750.00-0.75-1.50-2.25
60
45
30
15
0
Standardized Residual
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
550500450400350300250200150100501
2
1
0
-1
-2
Observation Order
St
an
da
rd
iz
ed
 R
es
id
ua
l
Normal Probability Plot Versus Fits
Histogram Versus Order
Residual Plots for Slippage
 
 
 Constant variance, often termed homoscedasticity, is apparent when analyzing the 
standardized residual versus fitted values plot as the residuals are randomly scattered around 
zero.  Prior to the removal of outliers, including many observations with large standardized 
residuals, no patterns were apparent.  Aside from constant variance, this random scattering can 
also indicate the presence of linear relationships within the model. 
 Several of the agricultural input costs were automatically removed from the model by the 
Minitab 15 software after they were identified as being highly correlated with other predictor 
variables.  This is most likely the result of comparing regional level input cost data and the 
similarities of increases and decreases from year to year amongst the different crops.  The 
variables removed at this stage include the cost of corn custom operations, cost of corn energy 
inputs, cost of soybean seed, cost of soybean fertilizer, cost of soybean custom operations, and 
cost of soybean energy inputs.  Additional variables with p-values exceeding the alpha, or 
acceptable probability, value (0.05) were removed from the model, including the cost of wheat 
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fertilizer, cost of sorghum seed, cost of sorghum fertilizer, cost of sorghum custom operations, 
and cost of corn fertilizer.  A stepwise regression analysis was run to determine the impact of 
removing variables on the fit of the model.  While the R-squared value is indicative of how well 
the model fits the data, including too many terms in the model can make this value artificially 
high.  Therefore, in determining the best fit model, the values for adjusted R-square (representing 
the fit of the model after adjusting for the number of terms) and S value (representing the 
standard distance that data values fall from the regression line) were used.  Results from the 
stepwise regression indicated a precipitous drop in adjusted R-square with the removal of any 
variables and a slight increase in the S value.  Because of this, it was determined that a model 
including all of the remaining predictor variables is the best fit.  The results from the regression 
model with the remaining predictor variables are shown in Table 6.1.     
 
Table 6.1 Initial Best Fit Regression Model Results 
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P VIF 
Constant 10.062 1.515 6.64 0.000  
$ Paid Wheat -0.9867 0.1498 -6.59 0.000 43.124 
$ Paid Sorghum 1.6359 0.2055 7.96 0.000 118.968 
$ Paid Corn -2.5124 0.3346 -7.51 0.000 116.960 
$ Paid Soybeans -0.35538 0.06164 -5.77 0.000 17.363 
Land Value Irr Cropland -0.0003538 0.0001596 -2.22 0.027 5.707 
Land Value NI Cropland 0.0018718 0.0003895 4.81 0.000 13.716 
Land Value Pastureland -0.0030141 0.0004911 -6.14 0.000 12.406 
Cost Wheat Seed 0.8953 0.1067 8.39 0.000 40.109 
Cost Wheat Custom Ops -0.65591 0.09533 -6.88 0.000 43.132 
Cost Wheat Energy Inputs 0.13543 0.03000 4.51 0.000 43.239 
Cost Sorghum Energy Inputs -0.09175 0.01967 -4.67 0.000 61.877 
Cost Corn Seed -0.09192 0.01554 -5.91 0.000 17.628 
     
S = 0.373064 R-Sq = 20.0% R-Sq(adj) = 18.2%    
      
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Regression 12 18.6159 1.5513 11.15 0.000 
Residual Error 535 74.4594 0.1392
Lack of Fit 72 21.1798 0.2942 2.56 0.000 
Pure Error 463 53.2796 0.1151
Total 547 93.0753 
    
      
 
 Although the individual predictor p-values are all less than the alpha value (0.05) and all 
T-values are greater than the alpha value, the adjusted R-squared indicates that these predictors 
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account for only 18.2 percent of the variation in CRP slippage rates.  While the analysis of 
variance p-value for regression (< 0.001) shows that the regression coefficients are significantly 
different from zero, the lack of fit p-value (< 0.001) indicates that the predictors used are not 
sufficient to explain the variation in CRP slippage rates.  Because replicates of the response at 
certain settings of the predictors are observed, the sums of squares (SS) for residual error is equal 
to the SS of pure error plus the SS of lack of fit, implying that the variation caused by pure error 
and inadequate model specification make up the unexplained variation within the model.  Mean 
squares (MS) represents the sums of squares (SS) divided by the degrees of freedom (DF), and 
the F-value is used to determine whether all coefficients within the model are zero (a hypothesis 
test more directly analyzed with the p-value).     
 Given the significant p-value regarding lack of fit and the low explanatory power of the 
model, it is clear that additional independent variables are required to adequately explain the 
variations in CRP slippage rates.  Interestingly, many of the predicted relationships between CRP 
slippage rates and predictor variables were not reflected by the regression model.  Based on the 
sign of each variable’s coefficient within the model, the price paid for wheat, corn, and soybeans 
all have a negative relationship with CRP slippage (predicted positive relationship) and land 
values for non-irrigated cropland, the cost of wheat seed, and the cost of wheat energy inputs all 
show a positive relationship (predicted negative).  Realizing that unexpected signs for model 
coefficients can be a sign of high multicollinearity within the model, the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) was added to the regression analysis.  The VIF measures the increase in variability of each 
regression coefficient due to a linear association with other predictor variables.  A VIF value of 
one means that the variable is not linearly related to the other variables and a VIF value greater 
than ten generally indicates that multicollinearity may be causing problems in estimation.  With 
the exception of the land value for irrigated crops, all of the predictor variables had a VIF value 
in excess of ten.  Therefore, difficulty in estimation due to high multicollinearity amongst the 
predictor variables is the probable cause of the unexpected coefficient signs. 
 Given the similarities in annual fluctuation amongst output prices paid and various input 
costs for each of the four main grain crops, like variables were combined as an average for each 
year, effectively reducing the number of variables used for the regression analysis.  Using these 
annual averages, the regression analysis was completed at the district level with the intent of 
improving estimation within the model, expanding the analysis to include all areas of the state, 
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and identifying those areas within the state where slippage is best explained by agricultural 
output prices and input costs.  As before, output prices paid for agricultural crops were predicted 
to have a positive relationship with CRP slippage and input costs a negative relationship.  
Additionally, the annually reported total of irrigated acreage was added as a predictor variable in 
an attempt to determine the impact of this practice, if any, on district level CRP slippage 
(predicted positive relationship). 
 Although analysis at the district level greatly decreases the number of observations (11, 
with 11 years of observation), it was completed for each district in an attempt to show spatial 
variations in regard to relationship strengths.  Initial scatterplots for each district did show some 
improvement with respect to linear relationships amongst the predictor variables and CRP 
slippage rates, however apparent non-normaility and a lack of constant variance for all datasets 
made further analysis difficult.  Because of the small sample size, the removal of outliers as an 
attempt to standardize the datasets was not possible.  To increase the number of observations, the 
datasets for all districts were combined and a statewide analysis completed.  As expected, non-
normality and a lack of constant variance were still present within the statewide district dataset.  
However, given the increased sample size (99, based on 11 years and 9 districts), I was able to 
standardize the dataset by removing the outliers.  As most outliers were linked to those districts 
with extreme slippage values, all observations for the northwestern, east-central, and 
southeastern districts were removed from the dataset.  The resulting 66 observation dataset 
(combining observations from the west-central, southwestern, north-central, central, south-
central, and northeastern districts) showed much improvement with regards to linearity (Fig. 
B.7), normality,  and constant variance (Fig. 6.4). 
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Figure 6.4 Residual Plots for District Level Regression Analysis 
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 Satisfied that the assumptions for regression analysis had been met, the analysis was 
completed (alpha=0.05).  Combining the like variables as district averages greatly reduced 
multicollinearity within the model, with VIF values for all predictor variables near one (Table 
6.2).  The adjusted R-squared value of 50.0 percent also showed significant improvement in 
regard to the amount of variance in slippage explained by the predictor variables, and the overall 
regression p-value (< 0.001) implies that at least one coefficient in the model is significantly 
different from zero.  However, the p-values for the average price paid for grain crops and the 
average costs combined are both greater than the alpha value (0.05) indicating that they may 
need to be excluded from the model.  A step-wise regression analysis revealed that removing 
these two predictor variables did not significantly impact the strength of the model.  The results 
for the final district level model are shown in Table 6.3.           
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Table 6.2 District Level Regression Model Results. 
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P VIF 
Constant 2.5455 0.6171 4.12 0.000  
Avg $ Paid Grain Crops 0.10644 0.08708 1.22 0.226 1.010 
Avg Land Value -0.0033618 0.0004363 -7.71 0.000 1.628 
Avg Costs Combined 0.002431 0.006708 0.36 0.718 1.132 
Total Irrigated Acres -0.00000066 0.00000018 -3.75 0.000 1.492 
     
S = 0.521398 R-Sq = 53.1% R-Sq(adj) = 50.0%    
 
Analysis of Variance  
    
Source DF SS MS F P 
Regression 4 18.7816 4.6954 17.27 0.000 
Residual Error 61 16.5832 0.2719
Total 65 35.3648  
    
 
  
Table 6.3 District Level Regression Model Results (grain crops average price and 
average costs variables removed). 
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P VIF 
Constant 3.1084 0.3418 9.09 0.000  
Avg Land Value -0.0033502 0.0004087 -8.20 0.000 1.438 
Total Irrigated Acres -0.00000065 0.00000065 -3.80 0.000 1.438 
     
S = 0.519657 R-Sq = 51.9% R-Sq(adj) = 50.4% 
 
Analysis of Variance  
   
Source DF SS MS F P 
Regression 2 18.3521 9.1760 33.98 0.000 
Residual Error 63 17.0127 0.2700
Total 65 35.3648  
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CHAPTER 7 - Discussion and Conclusion 
Discussion of Slippage 
The results of this study show that in 66 of the 105 counties in Kansas, positive average 
slippage rates were apparent over the period of 1995-2005.  Mapping the CRP slippage rates 
indicates a large spatial disparity, with the vast majority of slippage occurring in the western 
two-thirds of the state.  Annual slippage averages at the district level ranged from a high of 350 
percent in the northwest (2000) to a low of -788 percent in the southeast (1999).  While the 
statewide average slippage rate of -68 percent over the entire study period would indicate that 
acreage is being removed from production in excess of that which is retired under the CRP, 
county level calculations reveal an average slippage of 106 percent within the sixty-six county 
refined study area from 1995-2005.   
As discussed in Chapter 3, the main differences between the eastern and western areas of 
Kansas include population densities, land ownership patterns, acreage in crop production, and 
acreage enrolled in the CRP.  While a difference in the ratio of cultivated acreage to CRP 
acreage may have some bearing on the lack of slippage in the eastern one-third of the state, the 
availability of non-cropland for conversion to production is a more likely cause.  If land is not 
available for conversion to production, then increases in the acreage under cultivation are not 
possible.  Although when driving through parts of western Kansas it may seem like every square-
inch of land is already in row crops, in comparison to eastern Kansas it is a veritable blank page 
of open range including over 2 million acres of CRP, much of which will be expiring in the near 
future.  In regard to the difference in population density, the negative slippage rates in the eastern 
counties and their general proximity to urban centers may be indicative of urban sprawl.  As 
developers drive up prices for land near urban centers, it is no longer economically feasible for 
farmers to purchase uncultivated parcels for conversion to production or even retain that land 
which is already in production for agricultural purposes.  In addition, the smaller farm units in 
eastern Kansas may mean that individual farmers have less uncultivated land to open up to 
cultivation.  Another factor may be the much greater tendency of farmers in the eastern portion 
of the state to enroll buffers and filter strips—basically field portions rather than entire fields—
than those in central and western Kansas.  In other words, the entire configuration of farmland in 
eastern Kansas may not be conducive to slippage.  Additionally, easement programs such as the 
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Grassland Reserve Program (GRP) which emphasizes support for working grazing operations to 
keep them from being converted to cropland, may be of more interest to landowners in the 
eastern Flint Hills region of the state (as opposed to CRP, which has required payment reductions 
for grazing).  
Aside from the availability of uncultivated land for conversion to production in western 
Kansas affecting slippage rates, the lack of precipitation in the region requires heavy use of 
groundwater for irrigation which may also provide incentive for cultivating new areas.  As the 
use of groundwater for irrigation in these areas rapidly outpaces the rate of aquifer recharge, 
water tables drop.  The lower the water table becomes, the energy costs for raising the water to 
the surface increase exponentially, and eventually it is no longer economically feasible to irrigate 
the acreage above this particular area of the aquifer.  Therefore, the possibility exists for 
expansion of production to previously uncultivated areas with higher water tables.  This seems 
unlikely, however—given the history of high dependence on groundwater for production in the 
area, those areas with the best access to groundwater generally would already be in production.  
Acreage data regarding specific practices such as irrigation are generally reported by NASS at 
the district level; however, some districts are reported at the county level.  Although it would be 
beneficial research, the counties that are accounted for individually are not annually consistent, 
making it very difficult to obtain a usable dataset for the analysis of irrigated lands in relation to 
CRP slippage at the county level for most districts. 
             
Discussion of Data Analysis 
The goal of this study was to answer the question “Is there a relationship between 
fluctuations in agricultural commodity output prices, input costs and Conservation Reserve 
Program slippage rates in Kansas?”  To accomplish this goal, the following objectives were 
addressed: 
1) Determination of the annual slippage rates for each county in Kansas between 1995 
and 2005, using agricultural statistics at the county level.  
2) Refinement of the study area by excluding those counties with a negative average 
annual slippage value for the study period (1995-2005). 
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3) Collection of annual grain crop output prices, input costs and land values in Kansas 
between 1995 and 2005, using agricultural statistics at the district and regional-level. 
4) Completion of statistical analysis to determine the strength of relationships between 
annual CRP slippage rates, agricultural commodity output prices and production costs. 
  
 Because linear relationships between my response variable and independent variables 
was a basic assumption of regression analysis that had to be met, I began by producing 
scatterplots of each predictor variable against slippage and included a fitted regression line 
within each plot.  The apparent lack of any major positive or negative linear relationships was 
not promising, but there also did not seem to be any evidence of curvilinear relationships.  As 
was expected, the comparison of regionally reported agricultural input cost data to county level 
slippage resulted in vertical bars of clustered points within the scatterplots.  Additionally, the 
similarities in data values amongst some of the input costs for the different crops resulted in a 
high degree of multicollinearity within the model.  Those independent variables that were shown 
to be highly intercorrelated were removed from the model.  Given the fact that multicollinearity 
does not reduce the predictive power or reliability of the model as a whole, I was satisfied and 
proceeded with the regression analysis after removal of the highly correlated variables. 
 The initial regression results indicated several predictor variables that were not 
significant, some non-normality, and many outliers.  The identified non-significant variables 
were removed from the model.  In order to improve normality, the dataset was cleaned by 
removing the outlying observations as identified on the plot of standardized residuals versus 
fitted values.  Once completed, normality was drastically improved and the altered dataset was 
run for analysis.  While the final best fit model showed improvement, the regression analysis 
ultimately showed a significant lack of fit within the model, indicating the need for additional 
predictor variables in order to account for variations in CRP slippage rates.  Although the model 
does indicate the presence of a minor relationship between the selected variables of agricultural 
commodity output prices and input costs with CRP slippage rates, further analysis is warranted 
to identify additional sub-regional variables impacting slippage.  
 Once the predictor variables were averaged, and combined in the case of input costs, 
multicollinearity was effectively removed from the model.  The district level analysis showed 
great improvement in terms of the models ability to explain the variance in CRP slippage after 
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removing the northwestern, east-central, and southeastern districts, indicating significant 
relationships between agricultural land values and total acreage of irrigated cropland within the 
remaining six districts.  As the cost of acquiring agricultural land for production increases, the 
expansion of cropland within districts should increase.  This negative relationship was apparent 
within the final model.  On the other hand, a positive relationship was expected between total 
irrigated cropland and CRP slippage, and the final model indicates that there is a negative 
relationship.  As total irrigated cropland increases, the average district level slippage should 
logically also increase.  It is possible that areas with large amounts of irrigated acreage may have 
less land available for conversion to cropland, effectively reducing the ability for acreage to be 
slipped. 
 Future research pertaining to the determinants of CRP slippage, other than the economic 
variables examined in this study, is needed in order to identify additional contributing variables.  
It is possible that many farmers are utilizing the CRP as a part of their crop rotation.  It would 
make sense for producers to enroll less productive fields in the CRP in order to improve the soil 
quality, with the intent of cropping it again once the contract expires.  As long as general sign-
ups are an option, producers will be able to continue this cycle.  It will be crucial to monitor the 
future use of expiring acreage over the next four years, especially if no general sign-up is made 
available. 
  Analysis with respect to the impact of weather on producers planting decisions could be 
beneficial.  Lags among variables and land use changes also should be considered.  It may be 
helpful to explore physical characteristics of the terrain, if accurate locations of CRP tracts can 
be obtained.  While an analysis at this level would be time consuming, site-specific (or county 
level generalization depending on data availability) analysis regarding soil types and 
terrain/slopes could indicate relationships between these physical characteristics and acreage 
slippage.  Other characteristics that should be analyzed include farm size and farming practices, 
although the latter would be extremely difficult given the lack of specific data in reporting.  Farm 
size may play a crucial role because of the disparity in federal farm program participation 
between large agri-business and smaller individual operations.  Additional potential variables for 
exploration include variations in landowner characteristics.  Social aspects, including factors like 
landowner age, education, income and income sources (including land leases for outdoor 
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recreation) may also play a role in the decision-making associated with CRP enrollment and with 
slippage.           
Due to a lack of consistency, both temporally and in terms of scale, in agricultural data 
reporting, alternative methods should be sought for identifying total acreage in production.  
Slippage calculations can be significantly inflated when acreage in production is overestimated, 
making accurate analysis of relationships difficult.  A geographically-weighted regression 
analysis could be beneficial for future research by helping to identify those areas where 
relationships between individual variables and CRP acreage slippage are the strongest.   
     
Conclusions 
The results of this research have provided evidence of the effectiveness of the CRP in 
reducing total land in agricultural production at the county level within the state of Kansas.  
Although many variables affecting the occurrence of acreage slippage remain to be explained, 
this county level analysis and the recognized spatial relationships of slippage in relation to the 
CRP have helped to identify additional avenues for future research.  Additionally, this study has 
provided an area of focus for conservation program coordinators charged with the task of 
assessing program compliance. 
The lack of available practice-specific agricultural data at the subregional level is 
problematic both from a research perspective and in accurately calculating acreage slippage.  
Non-reporting of the practice of double-cropping can lead to over reported acreage in production 
total and, consequently, inflated slippage values.  This is an issue of increasing concern as 
greater numbers of producers tend away traditional crop rotation, favoring increased fertilizer 
use and continuous cropping practices.  In relation to research, the lack of reported data does not 
allow for county level analysis of variables such as irrigated cropland. 
As a multiple objective program, slippage calculations alone cannot analyze the overall 
effectiveness of the CRP.  Slippage rates do not account for, or compare, the tract-specific 
benefits of enrolling one property while another is converted to agricultural production.  
However, the conversion of unbroken or fallow acreage to agricultural production, especially in 
areas with suitable EBI scores for enrollment in the CRP, does negatively impact the net gain of 
environmental benefits for that area to some extent.  Because the purpose of the CRP is to 
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improve rather than maintain environmental benefits, enrollment in the program requires that the 
land be in agricultural production prior to enrollment.  While this is unavoidable within the CRP, 
additional easement-type programs such as the Grassland Reserve Program (GRP) that serve to 
maintain the current state of properties, may help to curb the occurrence of land slippage. 
Contract expirations over the next several years may be shifting the focus and common 
conservation practices applied through the CRP within Kansas.  Because current national 
enrollment is approximately 34.7 million acres and the 2008 Farm Bill reduced the national CRP 
acreage cap to 32 million, there are no general sign-up periods for new enrollment predicted for 
the near future.  In Kansas alone, 1.98 million acres currently enrolled in the CRP are set to 
expire by 2012.  The lack of a general sign-up, compounded by the expiring acreage, has shifted 
the focus to enrolling expiring properties in continuous CRP practices such as field buffers in an 
attempt to mitigate the negative impacts of returning these lands to agricultural production.  
These shifts in acreage enrollment and practices may have interesting implications for future 
research of CRP slippage given the expected large increase of land in production and decrease in 
reserve acreage.                  
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Appendix A - Annual Slippage Calculations by County 
Table A.1 Annual Slippage Calculation Data by County 
Dist County Year A A* L S 
SE Allen 1995 137067.67 130738.06 6695.20 5.46% 
  1996 137067.67 124471.75 6603.10 -90.76% 
  1997 137067.67 119629.60 6439.00 -170.82% 
  1998 137067.67 128364.46 3044.90 -185.83% 
  1999 137067.67 122382.98 2568.40 -471.74% 
  2000 137067.67 127320.08 4888.30 -99.41% 
  2001 137067.67 123712.20 5308.40 -151.59% 
  2002 137067.67 123997.03 5449.90 -139.83% 
  2003 137067.67 128364.46 5569.70 -56.26% 
  2004 137067.67 113078.46 8842.70 -171.29% 
  2005 137067.67 112983.51 9428.40 -155.44% 
     Average: -153.41% 
       
EC Anderson 1995 151820.51 145209.95 8596.00 23.10% 
  1996 151820.51 150453.91 8370.70 83.67% 
  1997 151820.51 163611.47 8670.20 235.99% 
  1998 151820.51 145209.95 4006.10 -65.01% 
  1999 151820.51 144542.54 3443.00 -111.38% 
  2000 151820.51 149691.15 4391.50 51.51% 
  2001 151820.51 146830.81 4867.20 -2.52% 
  2002 151820.51 151979.42 4722.70 103.36% 
  2003 151820.51 154363.04 4803.60 152.93% 
  2004 151820.51 147307.53 5302.40 14.89% 
  2005 151820.51 141205.47 5997.50 -76.99% 
     Average: 37.23% 
       
NE Atchison 1995 127844.88 116295.73 6035.60 -91.35% 
  1996 127844.88 128938.67 6041.60 118.10% 
  1997 127844.88 133088.64 6060.60 186.52% 
  1998 127844.88 121700.35 6070.60 -1.22% 
  1999 127844.88 117164.33 5406.80 -97.54% 
  2000 127844.88 119480.59 5787.80 -44.52% 
  2001 127844.88 119384.08 6242.80 -35.53% 
  2002 127844.88 118322.46 6284.70 -51.52% 
  2003 127844.88 118901.53 6291.40 -42.15% 
  2004 127844.88 122568.95 5477.60 3.68% 
  2005 127844.88 121989.88 5601.20 -4.53% 
     Average: -5.46% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
SC Barber 1995 198565.19 142949.80 27149.40 -104.85% 
  1996 198565.19 155112.10 26939.10 -61.30% 
  1997 198565.19 150743.95 26934.70 -77.55% 
  1998 198565.19 144405.85 22682.30 -138.77% 
  1999 198565.19 143121.10 20665.00 -168.30% 
  2000 198565.19 128560.61 19113.80 -266.25% 
  2001 198565.19 139009.91 20507.00 -190.41% 
  2002 198565.19 134127.86 20426.20 -215.46% 
  2003 198565.19 129674.06 20478.50 -236.41% 
  2004 198565.19 129160.16 20708.30 -235.16% 
  2005 198565.19 135155.66 20657.60 -206.95% 
     Average: -172.86% 
       
C Barton 1995 326066.61 326497.63 25918.20 101.66% 
  1996 326066.61 351250.49 25982.60 196.93% 
  1997 326066.61 336103.22 25974.70 138.64% 
  1998 326066.61 340074.76 23531.50 159.53% 
  1999 326066.61 323542.06 20082.00 87.43% 
  2000 326066.61 318646.91 18060.70 58.92% 
  2001 326066.61 314675.37 17558.70 35.12% 
  2002 326066.61 309226.04 17612.70 4.38% 
  2003 326066.61 307563.54 17646.60 -4.85% 
  2004 326066.61 285489.16 20716.30 -95.87% 
  2005 326066.61 302853.11 20217.60 -14.82% 
     Average: 60.64% 
       
SE Bourbon 1995 106672.03 59576.97 21999.40 -114.07% 
  1996 106672.03 66207.01 21544.40 -87.82% 
  1997 106672.03 75171.57 20470.60 -53.88% 
  1998 106672.03 72090.00 9351.40 -269.81% 
  1999 106672.03 62751.92 7554.80 -481.35% 
  2000 106672.03 61911.49 10583.30 -322.94% 
  2001 106672.03 58269.64 14063.60 -244.17% 
  2002 106672.03 57989.49 14263.00 -241.32% 
  2003 106672.03 58456.40 14391.60 -235.03% 
  2004 106672.03 51639.60 18943.30 -190.51% 
  2005 106672.03 48184.51 19573.00 -198.82% 
     Average: -221.79% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 58
Dist County Year A A* L S 
NE Brown 1995 228381.96 215002.73 10625.00 -25.92% 
  1996 228381.96 244404.81 9547.50 267.82% 
  1997 228381.96 240632.83 9069.40 235.08% 
  1998 228381.96 229413.62 9343.30 111.04% 
  1999 228381.96 226705.53 8755.80 80.85% 
  2000 228381.96 229800.49 8582.50 116.53% 
  2001 228381.96 225931.79 9634.60 74.57% 
  2002 228381.96 222256.53 10043.30 39.01% 
  2003 228381.96 224577.75 10257.30 62.91% 
  2004 228381.96 225061.33 10860.60 69.42% 
  2005 228381.96 222449.97 10910.10 45.63% 
     Average: 97.90% 
       
SE Butler 1995 221706.84 179879.51 6810.10 -514.20% 
  1996 221706.84 191286.96 6523.10 -366.34% 
  1997 221706.84 188364.39 6482.60 -414.34% 
  1998 221706.84 179596.68 4207.30 -900.88% 
  1999 221706.84 168849.16 2966.00 -1682.12% 
  2000 221706.84 179502.40 2043.00 -1965.81% 
  2001 221706.84 183367.74 2124.20 -1704.87% 
  2002 221706.84 186196.03 2128.00 -1568.74% 
  2003 221706.84 187987.28 2148.10 -1469.74% 
  2004 221706.84 178559.64 1881.10 -2193.72% 
  2005 221706.84 180728.00 1858.50 -2104.94% 
     Average: -1353.25% 
       
EC Chase 1995 54750.89 45346.99 1498.30 -527.64% 
  1996 54750.89 47524.40 1506.20 -379.78% 
  1997 54750.89 46672.37 1506.20 -436.35% 
  1998 54750.89 44873.64 1527.80 -546.50% 
  1999 54750.89 43169.58 1130.00 -924.89% 
  2000 54750.89 45062.98 1048.40 -824.07% 
  2001 54750.89 46388.36 1125.30 -643.14% 
  2002 54750.89 43642.93 1073.90 -934.36% 
  2003 54750.89 42696.23 1083.90 -1012.16% 
  2004 54750.89 41370.85 1095.10 -1121.81% 
  2005 54750.89 46577.70 1224.90 -567.25% 
     Average: -719.81% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
SE Chautauqua 1995 30792.06 19447.62 4446.40 -155.14% 
  1996 30792.06 22291.37 4421.40 -92.26% 
  1997 30792.06 25869.00 4302.20 -14.43% 
  1998 30792.06 22016.17 3866.60 -126.97% 
  1999 30792.06 17246.00 4118.60 -228.90% 
  2000 30792.06 14127.04 4209.10 -295.93% 
  2001 30792.06 16603.86 4322.80 -228.22% 
  2002 30792.06 15503.05 4330.10 -253.09% 
  2003 30792.06 15869.99 4350.10 -243.03% 
  2004 30792.06 14310.51 4317.00 -281.78% 
  2005 30792.06 14035.31 4329.40 -287.05% 
     Average: -200.62% 
       
SE Cherokee 1995 216364.27 186919.57 4877.30 -503.71% 
  1996 216364.27 221122.69 4785.10 199.44% 
  1997 216364.27 193434.45 4726.20 -385.16% 
  1998 216364.27 196787.70 1585.10 -1135.04% 
  1999 216364.27 176955.64 1174.80 -3254.50% 
  2000 216364.27 198416.42 1166.40 -1438.74% 
  2001 216364.27 200524.17 1185.30 -1236.38% 
  2002 216364.27 206655.83 1247.60 -678.17% 
  2003 216364.27 217577.83 1231.30 198.56% 
  2004 216364.27 217194.60 1303.60 163.69% 
  2005 216364.27 196691.89 1474.70 -1233.99% 
     Average: -845.82% 
       
NW Cheyenne 1995 194887.51 192350.62 45816.30 94.46% 
  1996 194887.51 192441.22 45372.10 94.61% 
  1997 194887.51 191897.60 45090.50 93.37% 
  1998 194887.51 191353.98 42195.10 91.63% 
  1999 194887.51 199598.88 37149.90 112.68% 
  2000 194887.51 188907.70 40199.60 85.12% 
  2001 194887.51 191172.78 41465.90 91.04% 
  2002 194887.51 173595.75 41484.20 48.68% 
  2003 194887.51 193619.06 41450.10 96.94% 
  2004 194887.51 205035.07 42740.70 123.74% 
  2005 194887.51 197243.19 43854.10 105.37% 
     Average: 94.33% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
SW Clark 1995 103448.83 73470.10 45384.30 33.94% 
  1996 103448.83 83036.11 45317.00 54.96% 
  1997 103448.83 84447.49 44971.80 57.75% 
  1998 103448.83 81938.37 45039.80 52.24% 
  1999 103448.83 73705.33 46642.00 36.23% 
  2000 103448.83 70568.93 49660.50 33.79% 
  2001 103448.83 80919.04 51971.10 56.65% 
  2002 103448.83 105696.58 52115.50 104.31% 
  2003 103448.83 75038.30 52115.40 45.49% 
  2004 103448.83 72215.54 52293.00 40.27% 
  2005 103448.83 76528.09 52478.30 48.70% 
     Average: 51.30% 
       
NC Clay 1995 196409.69 212533.34 23369.60 168.99% 
  1996 196409.69 217389.11 22993.70 191.24% 
  1997 196409.69 218136.15 22579.10 196.22% 
  1998 196409.69 213000.24 17263.10 196.10% 
  1999 196409.69 205623.20 16947.10 154.37% 
  2000 196409.69 201421.10 19052.70 126.30% 
  2001 196409.69 204502.64 20351.60 139.77% 
  2002 196409.69 200300.53 20525.40 118.96% 
  2003 196409.69 209265.03 20499.30 162.71% 
  2004 196409.69 196005.04 21669.20 98.13% 
  2005 196409.69 201140.95 22389.90 121.13% 
     Average: 152.18% 
       
NC Cloud 1995 227141.85 244322.70 16513.90 204.04% 
  1996 227141.85 223320.48 16226.10 76.45% 
  1997 227141.85 221577.94 16086.30 65.41% 
  1998 227141.85 211397.83 14201.60 -10.86% 
  1999 227141.85 215433.19 13249.60 11.63% 
  2000 227141.85 220844.24 13817.00 54.42% 
  2001 227141.85 225888.44 14763.30 91.51% 
  2002 227141.85 213598.93 14706.50 7.91% 
  2003 227141.85 212865.23 14772.60 3.36% 
  2004 227141.85 211672.97 14987.00 -3.22% 
  2005 227141.85 219651.97 15075.60 50.32% 
     Average: 50.09% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
EC Coffey 1995 153175.12 141935.79 11685.20 3.82% 
  1996 153175.12 139204.44 11540.10 -21.06% 
  1997 153175.12 125453.53 11048.10 -150.92% 
  1998 153175.12 138733.52 11410.20 -26.57% 
  1999 153175.12 134024.30 11894.60 -61.00% 
  2000 153175.12 141370.68 12360.60 4.50% 
  2001 153175.12 138074.23 14356.90 -5.18% 
  2002 153175.12 139675.36 14384.00 6.15% 
  2003 153175.12 140523.02 14505.40 12.78% 
  2004 153175.12 130256.93 14371.30 -59.47% 
  2005 153175.12 130445.30 15031.50 -51.21% 
     Average: -31.65% 
       
SC Comanche 1995 129020.58 86049.73 41244.20 -4.19% 
  1996 129020.58 95205.69 41161.00 17.85% 
  1997 129020.58 89209.75 40923.30 2.72% 
  1998 129020.58 83375.87 40241.90 -13.43% 
  1999 129020.58 81107.14 39280.30 -21.98% 
  2000 129020.58 73814.79 42146.50 -30.99% 
  2001 129020.58 77460.97 42516.60 -21.27% 
  2002 129020.58 83213.82 42478.50 -7.84% 
  2003 129020.58 71708.11 42443.90 -35.03% 
  2004 129020.58 69925.54 42571.50 -38.81% 
  2005 129020.58 74544.03 42532.70 -28.08% 
     Average: -16.46% 
       
SE Cowley 1995 204030.01 178234.87 7221.20 -257.21% 
  1996 204030.01 219734.06 7312.40 314.76% 
  1997 204030.01 194613.71 7362.00 -27.90% 
  1998 204030.01 186332.28 7205.70 -145.61% 
  1999 204030.01 174462.22 6641.30 -345.21% 
  2000 204030.01 172345.85 6063.20 -422.56% 
  2001 204030.01 170321.50 6433.30 -423.97% 
  2002 204030.01 179523.10 6200.70 -295.23% 
  2003 204030.01 187804.53 6206.50 -161.43% 
  2004 204030.01 184952.04 5797.80 -229.06% 
  2005 204030.01 180075.19 6044.50 -296.31% 
     Average: -208.16% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
SE Crawford 1995 156881.77 139103.73 12402.60 -43.34% 
  1996 156881.77 165297.97 11796.40 171.35% 
  1997 156881.77 149505.77 11484.90 35.78% 
  1998 156881.77 154706.80 3826.80 43.16% 
  1999 156881.77 134659.22 2809.00 -691.12% 
  2000 156881.77 148371.00 2224.10 -282.66% 
  2001 156881.77 142035.21 3333.90 -345.32% 
  2002 156881.77 144399.31 3314.10 -276.65% 
  2003 156881.77 152720.95 3421.40 -21.61% 
  2004 156881.77 147898.18 6138.50 -46.35% 
  2005 156881.77 134091.83 6311.10 -261.11% 
     Average: -156.17% 
       
NW Decatur 1995 178322.47 188202.34 7975.10 223.88% 
  1996 178322.47 203203.98 8306.40 399.55% 
  1997 178322.47 201203.76 8329.20 374.71% 
  1998 178322.47 201294.68 7874.10 391.74% 
  1999 178322.47 195294.02 7174.60 336.55% 
  2000 178322.47 193748.40 4742.60 425.26% 
  2001 178322.47 198567.11 5775.60 450.52% 
  2002 178322.47 190566.23 5926.40 306.60% 
  2003 178322.47 197657.92 5892.20 428.15% 
  2004 178322.47 201294.68 7317.70 413.93% 
  2005 178322.47 207840.85 7540.20 491.48% 
     Average: 385.67% 
       
C Dickinson 1995 298796.74 279336.31 23114.40 15.81% 
  1996 298796.74 290695.99 23695.60 65.81% 
  1997 298796.74 287343.95 24967.20 54.13% 
  1998 298796.74 285761.05 26356.20 50.54% 
  1999 298796.74 275332.49 27116.50 13.47% 
  2000 298796.74 278218.97 29210.40 29.55% 
  2001 298796.74 263134.81 32135.70 -10.97% 
  2002 298796.74 258386.09 32156.90 -25.67% 
  2003 298796.74 262669.24 32637.10 -10.69% 
  2004 298796.74 263507.25 35808.90 1.45% 
  2005 298796.74 264065.93 36939.10 5.98% 
     Average: 17.22% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
NE Doniphan 1995 152874.16 136381.11 11218.30 -47.02% 
  1996 152874.16 151138.05 11107.50 84.37% 
  1997 152874.16 150752.24 10921.50 80.57% 
  1998 152874.16 146122.62 13444.40 49.78% 
  1999 152874.16 141203.64 13533.70 13.77% 
  2000 152874.16 144579.41 14151.00 41.38% 
  2001 152874.16 146797.77 13834.10 56.08% 
  2002 152874.16 146411.97 13497.20 52.12% 
  2003 152874.16 151523.85 12693.60 89.36% 
  2004 152874.16 150366.44 11039.40 77.28% 
  2005 152874.16 147665.83 11048.90 52.86% 
     Average: 50.05% 
       
EC Douglas 1995 109442.85 75649.97 5907.10 -472.07% 
  1996 109442.85 80642.10 6103.50 -371.87% 
  1997 109442.85 96290.51 5580.30 -135.69% 
  1998 109442.85 81026.11 4435.90 -540.61% 
  1999 109442.85 78626.05 4645.40 -563.38% 
  2000 109442.85 77282.01 4946.70 -550.15% 
  2001 109442.85 77378.02 5603.30 -472.25% 
  2002 109442.85 74977.95 5607.80 -514.59% 
  2003 109442.85 75553.97 5670.30 -497.66% 
  2004 109442.85 73825.92 6196.30 -474.81% 
  2005 109442.85 72769.90 6180.40 -493.38% 
     Average: -462.40% 
       
SC Edwards 1995 217614.43 212506.11 48680.20 89.51% 
  1996 217614.43 229131.37 48191.90 123.90% 
  1997 217614.43 201825.08 47457.20 66.73% 
  1998 217614.43 215478.23 40455.70 94.72% 
  1999 217614.43 215385.35 35907.30 93.79% 
  2000 217614.43 221701.09 33139.90 112.33% 
  2001 217614.43 234425.45 34440.10 148.81% 
  2002 217614.43 212320.36 34131.20 84.49% 
  2003 217614.43 216778.53 34225.90 97.56% 
  2004 217614.43 209719.76 34303.70 76.99% 
  2005 217614.43 220122.16 34162.70 107.34% 
     Average: 99.65% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 64
Dist County Year A A* L S 
SE Elk 1995 44959.95 28497.04 8320.50 -97.86% 
  1996 44959.95 24923.45 8180.80 -144.92% 
  1997 44959.95 29046.82 7746.30 -105.43% 
  1998 44959.95 26756.06 5815.60 -213.02% 
  1999 44959.95 24556.93 5111.10 -299.19% 
  2000 44959.95 25473.23 5075.40 -283.94% 
  2001 44959.95 24923.45 5556.40 -260.60% 
  2002 44959.95 25106.71 5600.90 -254.47% 
  2003 44959.95 25473.23 5608.20 -247.47% 
  2004 44959.95 22907.59 5380.10 -309.89% 
  2005 44959.95 23823.89 5327.80 -296.71% 
     Average: -228.50% 
       
C Ellis 1995 158968.58 139123.38 33605.00 40.95% 
  1996 158968.58 164587.93 33417.10 116.82% 
  1997 158968.58 147108.78 33516.60 64.62% 
  1998 158968.58 145777.88 27549.30 52.12% 
  1999 158968.58 146842.60 25618.30 52.67% 
  2000 158968.58 148617.13 18885.10 45.19% 
  2001 158968.58 147020.05 19544.10 38.86% 
  2002 158968.58 139833.20 19723.70 2.98% 
  2003 158968.58 137792.48 19824.70 -6.82% 
  2004 158968.58 136905.22 20472.50 -7.77% 
  2005 158968.58 143825.89 21610.00 29.93% 
     Average: 39.05% 
       
C Ellsworth 1995 148550.03 131308.43 28195.80 38.85% 
  1996 148550.03 134666.00 28557.80 51.38% 
  1997 148550.03 117515.14 29291.90 -5.95% 
  1998 148550.03 125228.49 27726.80 15.89% 
  1999 148550.03 125591.47 27670.60 17.03% 
  2000 148550.03 133214.08 26969.50 43.14% 
  2001 148550.03 127497.12 27882.60 24.49% 
  2002 148550.03 127860.10 28001.60 26.11% 
  2003 148550.03 128041.60 28096.40 27.01% 
  2004 148550.03 126680.42 28591.00 23.51% 
  2005 148550.03 126498.93 29745.60 25.87% 
     Average: 26.12% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 65
Dist County Year A A* L S 
SW Finney 1995 430166.63 366471.12 59168.40 -7.65% 
  1996 430166.63 415046.22 58911.60 74.33% 
  1997 430166.63 389610.86 57221.40 29.12% 
  1998 430166.63 376112.68 54069.50 0.03% 
  1999 430166.63 357288.68 59665.20 -22.14% 
  2000 430166.63 362155.37 60860.50 -11.75% 
  2001 430166.63 385937.89 65244.90 32.21% 
  2002 430166.63 378867.41 65360.50 21.51% 
  2003 430166.63 375194.43 65633.90 16.24% 
  2004 430166.63 369776.80 72096.80 16.24% 
  2005 430166.63 370144.09 77177.70 22.23% 
     Average: 15.49% 
       
SW Ford 1995 317533.52 314326.71 49318.50 93.50% 
  1996 317533.52 332128.97 48884.70 129.86% 
  1997 317533.52 318192.86 49146.50 101.34% 
  1998 317533.52 308932.09 46722.20 81.59% 
  1999 317533.52 303897.11 47117.80 71.06% 
  2000 317533.52 306504.51 54544.00 79.78% 
  2001 317533.52 333387.72 57990.10 127.34% 
  2002 317533.52 321609.46 58199.50 107.00% 
  2003 317533.52 316844.20 58071.80 98.81% 
  2004 317533.52 289961.00 65617.40 57.98% 
  2005 317533.52 304076.93 70812.50 81.00% 
     Average: 93.57% 
       
EC Franklin 1995 134773.29 113327.75 8972.60 -139.01% 
  1996 134773.29 115329.34 8669.70 -124.27% 
  1997 134773.29 122382.54 8690.40 -42.58% 
  1998 134773.29 114757.46 5803.20 -244.91% 
  1999 134773.29 109610.53 4620.40 -444.60% 
  2000 134773.29 120190.32 4480.70 -225.46% 
  2001 134773.29 116187.16 5199.30 -257.47% 
  2002 134773.29 119237.19 5164.50 -200.82% 
  2003 134773.29 120285.64 5144.30 -181.63% 
  2004 134773.29 113423.07 4964.50 -330.06% 
  2005 134773.29 116949.67 5311.20 -235.59% 
     Average: -220.58% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
EC Geary 1995 54786.43 54285.52 2302.20 78.24% 
  1996 54786.43 56070.00 2544.60 150.44% 
  1997 54786.43 48556.43 2981.80 -108.93% 
  1998 54786.43 48932.11 3018.70 -93.94% 
  1999 54786.43 45363.16 3154.60 -198.72% 
  2000 54786.43 47053.71 3367.10 -129.65% 
  2001 54786.43 45551.00 3696.40 -149.85% 
  2002 54786.43 44517.89 3692.50 -178.09% 
  2003 54786.43 42545.57 3787.70 -223.17% 
  2004 54786.43 42545.57 3670.00 -233.54% 
  2005 54786.43 42921.25 3770.40 -214.69% 
     Average: -118.35% 
       
WC Gove 1995 195994.48 186973.45 18877.40 52.21% 
  1996 195994.48 246917.78 18694.10 372.40% 
  1997 195994.48 195348.02 18394.80 96.49% 
  1998 195994.48 204868.59 14512.70 161.15% 
  1999 195994.48 206631.66 17019.00 162.50% 
  2000 195994.48 211039.33 23996.90 162.69% 
  2001 195994.48 231050.17 28345.30 223.67% 
  2002 195994.48 202223.99 28475.60 121.88% 
  2003 195994.48 201254.30 28546.50 118.43% 
  2004 195994.48 204163.37 32403.70 125.21% 
  2005 195994.48 206631.66 36731.70 128.96% 
     Average: 156.87% 
       
NW Graham 1995 163400.94 137330.03 67815.50 61.56% 
  1996 163400.94 131226.47 67793.50 52.54% 
  1997 163400.94 130616.12 67352.00 51.32% 
  1998 163400.94 138201.97 59355.80 57.55% 
  1999 163400.94 145787.82 54891.30 67.91% 
  2000 163400.94 155379.12 46424.60 82.72% 
  2001 163400.94 153809.63 47399.00 79.76% 
  2002 163400.94 150321.89 47272.80 72.33% 
  2003 163400.94 147706.08 46972.20 66.59% 
  2004 163400.94 147880.47 47506.70 67.33% 
  2005 163400.94 150845.05 47845.00 73.76% 
     Average: 66.67% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
SW Grant 1995 210520.37 186322.63 30019.90 19.39% 
  1996 210520.37 221781.63 30012.40 137.52% 
  1997 210520.37 199445.25 29849.10 62.90% 
  1998 210520.37 194977.98 31426.90 50.54% 
  1999 210520.37 192837.41 32204.10 45.09% 
  2000 210520.37 178318.76 35616.10 9.59% 
  2001 210520.37 197676.96 36998.00 65.29% 
  2002 210520.37 178877.17 36992.30 14.46% 
  2003 210520.37 185950.36 36997.30 33.59% 
  2004 210520.37 163707.05 41728.60 -12.19% 
  2005 210520.37 176736.60 41642.10 18.87% 
     Average: 40.46% 
       
SW Gray 1995 333315.77 328025.04 37935.40 86.05% 
  1996 333315.77 340091.61 38485.50 117.61% 
  1997 333315.77 334986.52 37908.50 104.41% 
  1998 333315.77 335079.34 35487.80 104.97% 
  1999 333315.77 330067.07 38373.30 91.53% 
  2000 333315.77 317907.69 44390.80 65.29% 
  2001 333315.77 329974.25 50035.20 93.32% 
  2002 333315.77 310482.10 50261.90 54.57% 
  2003 333315.77 309925.19 50519.90 53.70% 
  2004 333315.77 291825.33 54059.80 23.25% 
  2005 333315.77 311410.30 54989.50 60.16% 
     Average: 77.72% 
       
WC Greeley 1995 206666.39 183120.66 83845.90 71.92% 
  1996 206666.39 247273.41 84774.40 147.90% 
  1997 206666.39 202228.15 84773.70 94.76% 
  1998 206666.39 199375.00 84223.00 91.34% 
  1999 206666.39 197127.06 76812.10 87.58% 
  2000 206666.39 196003.09 77949.70 86.32% 
  2001 206666.39 258253.73 80608.80 164.00% 
  2002 206666.39 297073.93 80314.80 212.57% 
  2003 206666.39 238108.73 80307.80 139.15% 
  2004 206666.39 224794.01 81029.90 122.37% 
  2005 206666.39 217099.14 80771.60 112.92% 
     Average: 120.98% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
SE Greenwood 1995 68837.86 40560.20 5173.30 -446.61% 
  1996 68837.86 54482.46 4968.30 -188.94% 
  1997 68837.86 54760.90 4861.60 -189.55% 
  1998 68837.86 43623.09 3586.80 -602.99% 
  1999 68837.86 46593.18 3753.10 -492.70% 
  2000 68837.86 47150.07 3624.50 -498.37% 
  2001 68837.86 47335.70 3881.10 -454.02% 
  2002 68837.86 45943.47 3916.00 -484.64% 
  2003 68837.86 48913.55 3933.00 -406.59% 
  2004 68837.86 45665.03 3899.40 -494.27% 
  2005 68837.86 47428.51 4011.40 -433.71% 
     Average: -426.58% 
       
SW Hamilton 1995 214946.87 164877.52 126699.40 60.48% 
  1996 214946.87 219251.08 126674.30 103.40% 
  1997 214946.87 187540.49 126229.00 78.29% 
  1998 214946.87 185695.83 132092.80 77.86% 
  1999 214946.87 185168.78 134674.70 77.89% 
  2000 214946.87 162505.81 134015.10 60.87% 
  2001 214946.87 222237.68 133714.50 105.45% 
  2002 214946.87 195797.54 133988.90 85.71% 
  2003 214946.87 180688.89 133676.60 74.37% 
  2004 214946.87 157498.87 135206.80 57.51% 
  2005 214946.87 174188.66 133826.90 69.54% 
     Average: 77.40% 
       
SC Harper 1995 303994.97 264383.60 30880.10 -28.27% 
  1996 303994.97 293779.41 30483.70 66.49% 
  1997 303994.97 288775.87 30810.90 50.60% 
  1998 303994.97 273586.54 29465.70 -3.20% 
  1999 303994.97 269029.74 26521.00 -31.84% 
  2000 303994.97 252857.58 24358.60 -109.94% 
  2001 303994.97 255806.10 26447.30 -82.21% 
  2002 303994.97 257414.38 26526.60 -75.60% 
  2003 303994.97 258307.87 26779.20 -70.61% 
  2004 303994.97 254644.56 27297.80 -80.79% 
  2005 303994.97 260005.50 27025.00 -62.77% 
     Average: -38.92% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
SC Harvey 1995 245782.62 248851.34 6028.20 150.91% 
  1996 245782.62 255115.33 5987.10 255.88% 
  1997 245782.62 257488.06 5987.10 295.51% 
  1998 245782.62 248661.52 5008.50 157.48% 
  1999 245782.62 255684.79 4485.60 320.75% 
  2000 245782.62 256823.70 3505.50 414.96% 
  2001 245782.62 250559.70 3649.90 230.88% 
  2002 245782.62 250369.89 3657.20 225.43% 
  2003 245782.62 254545.88 3927.90 323.10% 
  2004 245782.62 246763.34 4144.80 123.66% 
  2005 245782.62 251413.88 4257.50 232.27% 
     Average: 248.26% 
       
SW Haskell 1995 271231.98 255277.16 19365.60 17.61% 
  1996 271231.98 277203.38 19519.90 130.59% 
  1997 271231.98 278602.92 19164.20 138.46% 
  1998 271231.98 271791.80 21770.40 102.57% 
  1999 271231.98 272444.92 21818.70 105.56% 
  2000 271231.98 253504.40 26405.20 32.86% 
  2001 271231.98 255090.55 26842.20 39.87% 
  2002 271231.98 266660.13 26817.30 82.95% 
  2003 271231.98 250985.22 26541.60 23.72% 
  2004 271231.98 244174.10 27557.80 1.81% 
  2005 271231.98 253970.92 27778.40 37.86% 
     Average: 64.90% 
       
SW Hodgeman 1995 166668.57 155131.12 26837.30 57.01% 
  1996 166668.57 170474.74 27584.70 113.80% 
  1997 166668.57 160572.75 27754.70 78.04% 
  1998 166668.57 157182.88 31552.20 69.94% 
  1999 166668.57 158967.03 42825.00 82.02% 
  2000 166668.57 153346.98 55616.50 76.05% 
  2001 166668.57 158342.58 63622.80 86.91% 
  2002 166668.57 147816.14 63781.20 70.44% 
  2003 166668.57 150135.52 63885.50 74.12% 
  2004 166668.57 135683.98 73453.70 57.82% 
  2005 166668.57 138003.36 78921.40 63.68% 
     Average: 75.44% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
NE Jackson 1995 117137.48 88256.43 20934.60 -37.96% 
  1996 117137.48 95184.09 20078.00 -9.34% 
  1997 117137.48 88920.73 19557.40 -44.28% 
  1998 117137.48 84745.16 17937.40 -80.59% 
  1999 117137.48 83606.36 17387.20 -92.85% 
  2000 117137.48 83131.87 17972.80 -89.21% 
  2001 117137.48 80474.68 20446.60 -79.31% 
  2002 117137.48 79335.89 20672.80 -82.86% 
  2003 117137.48 79905.29 20772.60 -79.24% 
  2004 117137.48 78386.90 20403.10 -89.92% 
  2005 117137.48 77532.80 20645.10 -91.84% 
     Average: -70.67% 
       
NE Jefferson 1995 118890.94 93177.91 14837.90 -73.29% 
  1996 118890.94 107307.35 14744.10 21.44% 
  1997 118890.94 111985.34 14083.80 50.97% 
  1998 118890.94 97760.43 11513.80 -83.52% 
  1999 118890.94 92605.10 11144.10 -135.87% 
  2000 118890.94 91364.00 11205.90 -145.65% 
  2001 118890.94 92318.69 12214.00 -117.56% 
  2002 118890.94 89072.74 12368.80 -141.08% 
  2003 118890.94 90695.71 12404.70 -127.29% 
  2004 118890.94 90409.30 12167.00 -134.09% 
  2005 118890.94 90313.84 12084.20 -136.48% 
     Average: -92.95% 
       
NC Jewell 1995 247060.66 238633.15 25862.10 67.41% 
  1996 247060.66 217486.06 26038.50 -13.58% 
  1997 247060.66 225944.90 26319.90 19.77% 
  1998 247060.66 231208.18 23857.90 33.55% 
  1999 247060.66 233463.87 22199.50 38.75% 
  2000 247060.66 244742.31 23052.30 89.94% 
  2001 247060.66 251697.36 24582.40 118.86% 
  2002 247060.66 246622.05 24649.40 98.22% 
  2003 247060.66 240700.87 24759.50 74.31% 
  2004 247060.66 241452.77 23492.10 76.13% 
  2005 247060.66 243144.53 22756.40 82.79% 
     Average: 62.38% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
EC Johnson 1995 76598.85 49522.64 2321.50 -1066.32% 
  1996 76598.85 54886.79 1816.90 -1095.01% 
  1997 76598.85 51917.35 1869.30 -1220.36% 
  1998 76598.85 47606.87 1704.60 -1600.81% 
  1999 76598.85 49522.64 1870.60 -1347.46% 
  2000 76598.85 49235.27 1972.70 -1287.11% 
  2001 76598.85 50863.68 2079.00 -1137.86% 
  2002 76598.85 50001.58 2062.00 -1189.88% 
  2003 76598.85 52300.50 2069.80 -1073.95% 
  2004 76598.85 45116.37 1847.70 -1603.87% 
  2005 76598.85 43296.39 1771.10 -1780.33% 
     Average: -1309.36% 
       
SW Kearny 1995 230792.62 196810.13 73545.70 53.79% 
  1996 230792.62 235178.44 71597.60 106.13% 
  1997 230792.62 213740.03 70322.40 75.75% 
  1998 230792.62 210427.66 67032.40 69.62% 
  1999 230792.62 213556.01 65614.50 73.73% 
  2000 230792.62 202790.80 64885.50 56.84% 
  2001 230792.62 233982.31 65374.60 104.88% 
  2002 230792.62 200950.60 65366.80 54.35% 
  2003 230792.62 204907.04 65583.60 60.53% 
  2004 230792.62 188161.16 66395.10 35.79% 
  2005 230792.62 209599.57 65922.20 67.85% 
     Average: 69.02% 
       
SC Kingman 1995 278567.15 230697.05 45580.30 -5.02% 
  1996 278567.15 280500.36 45647.00 104.24% 
  1997 278567.15 280040.07 45463.90 103.24% 
  1998 278567.15 270005.76 33418.70 74.38% 
  1999 278567.15 270650.17 32225.40 75.43% 
  2000 278567.15 238061.68 31404.70 -28.98% 
  2001 278567.15 231065.28 33431.90 -42.09% 
  2002 278567.15 225725.92 33297.90 -58.69% 
  2003 278567.15 231249.40 33112.00 -42.90% 
  2004 278567.15 225725.92 31984.70 -65.21% 
  2005 278567.15 230512.93 32802.20 -46.50% 
     Average: 6.17% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
SC Kiowa 1995 152870.22 123121.20 56238.00 47.10% 
  1996 152870.22 139471.12 55634.30 75.92% 
  1997 152870.22 139471.12 54742.50 75.52% 
  1998 152870.22 135677.22 50096.40 65.68% 
  1999 152870.22 140374.43 50111.90 75.06% 
  2000 152870.22 131070.33 49405.20 55.88% 
  2001 152870.22 130980.00 54436.80 59.79% 
  2002 152870.22 129986.36 54358.20 57.90% 
  2003 152870.22 127728.08 54031.70 53.47% 
  2004 152870.22 120591.93 63478.40 49.15% 
  2005 152870.22 120049.95 64860.90 49.40% 
     Average: 60.44% 
       
SE Labette 1995 166590.31 152545.01 7117.80 -97.33% 
  1996 166590.31 161474.47 6871.60 25.55% 
  1997 166590.31 145010.77 6750.50 -219.67% 
  1998 166590.31 145382.83 6225.10 -240.68% 
  1999 166590.31 116734.14 4499.80 -1007.96% 
  2000 166590.31 140825.08 4634.30 -455.97% 
  2001 166590.31 139336.84 5119.20 -432.38% 
  2002 166590.31 143522.53 5040.30 -357.67% 
  2003 166590.31 149754.55 5104.10 -229.85% 
  2004 166590.31 146964.09 5447.50 -260.28% 
  2005 166590.31 134407.03 5657.80 -468.83% 
     Average: -340.46% 
       
WC Lane 1995 165151.50 166984.22 24729.40 107.41% 
  1996 165151.50 219127.99 24751.20 318.08% 
  1997 165151.50 160776.63 24859.30 82.40% 
  1998 165151.50 171772.93 23279.20 128.44% 
  1999 165151.50 171772.93 27232.70 124.31% 
  2000 165151.50 163082.31 34286.00 93.96% 
  2001 165151.50 190750.43 39225.30 165.26% 
  2002 165151.50 158027.55 38967.80 81.72% 
  2003 165151.50 161397.39 38839.00 90.33% 
  2004 165151.50 147829.37 40606.80 57.34% 
  2005 165151.50 162727.59 41403.30 94.15% 
     Average: 122.13% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
NE Leavenworth 1995 92273.95 57615.58 5876.40 -489.79% 
  1996 92273.95 63529.76 5690.50 -405.13% 
  1997 92273.95 73068.76 5259.70 -265.14% 
  1998 92273.95 59523.38 4889.50 -569.81% 
  1999 92273.95 60191.11 5115.90 -527.12% 
  2000 92273.95 62003.52 5945.70 -409.11% 
  2001 92273.95 59237.21 6849.80 -382.30% 
  2002 92273.95 58283.31 7074.50 -380.47% 
  2003 92273.95 58760.26 7046.20 -375.63% 
  2004 92273.95 55898.56 6780.20 -436.49% 
  2005 92273.95 26899.99 6830.70 -857.06% 
     Average: -463.46% 
       
C Lincoln 1995 174238.98 157505.01 19197.60 12.83% 
  1996 174238.98 160773.13 18805.60 28.39% 
  1997 174238.98 153147.53 18676.30 -12.93% 
  1998 174238.98 159411.42 18202.80 18.54% 
  1999 174238.98 158322.04 19156.40 16.91% 
  2000 174238.98 161045.47 17617.40 25.11% 
  2001 174238.98 156415.64 18433.70 3.31% 
  2002 174238.98 155961.74 18298.60 0.12% 
  2003 174238.98 156143.30 18495.10 2.16% 
  2004 174238.98 153147.53 18658.60 -13.04% 
  2005 174238.98 156869.55 18135.10 4.22% 
     Average: 7.78% 
       
EC Linn 1995 114239.21 78856.22 26420.10 -33.92% 
  1996 114239.21 77345.20 26007.90 -41.86% 
  1997 114239.21 84144.78 25322.10 -18.85% 
  1998 114239.21 83200.40 16720.00 -85.64% 
  1999 114239.21 75928.62 16389.50 -133.75% 
  2000 114239.21 78950.66 17519.50 -101.42% 
  2001 114239.21 82161.57 19210.80 -66.98% 
  2002 114239.21 79895.05 19143.40 -79.40% 
  2003 114239.21 80839.43 19355.30 -72.56% 
  2004 114239.21 76873.01 19210.30 -94.51% 
  2005 114239.21 74795.36 19432.80 -102.98% 
     Average: -75.62% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
WC Logan 1995 192358.11 158472.96 33639.30 -0.73% 
  1996 192358.11 199545.86 32473.60 122.13% 
  1997 192358.11 162323.54 32395.60 7.29% 
  1998 192358.11 181405.33 24962.00 56.12% 
  1999 192358.11 179266.12 18969.70 30.98% 
  2000 192358.11 179693.96 19310.20 34.42% 
  2001 192358.11 224360.74 21151.00 251.31% 
  2002 192358.11 179950.67 21144.10 41.32% 
  2003 192358.11 190218.89 21294.80 89.95% 
  2004 192358.11 196465.40 23921.60 117.17% 
  2005 192358.11 200144.84 24985.50 131.17% 
     Average: 80.10% 
       
EC Lyon 1995 147832.26 129270.78 21982.30 15.56% 
  1996 147832.26 129647.66 21454.80 15.24% 
  1997 147832.26 129553.44 21167.10 13.65% 
  1998 147832.26 119848.71 15556.00 -79.89% 
  1999 147832.26 124748.19 13305.60 -73.49% 
  2000 147832.26 124088.64 11944.20 -98.79% 
  2001 147832.26 123900.20 13285.90 -80.13% 
  2002 147832.26 123523.32 13303.60 -82.72% 
  2003 147832.26 123900.20 13341.80 -79.38% 
  2004 147832.26 118435.40 13631.20 -115.66% 
  2005 147832.26 120602.48 13792.30 -97.43% 
     Average: -60.28% 
       
C McPherson 1995 362068.00 350928.90 16163.60 31.09% 
  1996 362068.00 370335.55 15821.30 152.26% 
  1997 362068.00 363708.89 15237.90 110.77% 
  1998 362068.00 362856.89 12340.80 106.39% 
  1999 362068.00 348372.91 9931.90 -37.89% 
  2000 362068.00 353958.23 8685.40 6.63% 
  2001 362068.00 345154.24 9326.00 -81.36% 
  2002 362068.00 341367.58 9386.70 -120.53% 
  2003 362068.00 344586.24 9127.60 -91.53% 
  2004 362068.00 339095.59 10210.70 -124.98% 
  2005 362068.00 344964.91 10189.80 -67.85% 
     Average: -10.64% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
C Marion 1995 293843.36 268390.86 18350.70 -38.70% 
  1996 293843.36 309228.82 18114.80 184.93% 
  1997 293843.36 296977.44 18000.80 117.41% 
  1998 293843.36 292323.81 17304.20 91.22% 
  1999 293843.36 280737.22 16029.50 18.24% 
  2000 293843.36 266016.56 14220.00 -95.69% 
  2001 293843.36 255474.67 15570.80 -146.41% 
  2002 293843.36 263357.35 15598.60 -95.44% 
  2003 293843.36 270955.11 15751.90 -45.30% 
  2004 293843.36 261742.82 16144.80 -98.83% 
  2005 293843.36 269720.47 16639.30 -44.98% 
     Average: -13.96% 
       
NE Marshall 1995 296957.57 309412.88 21725.90 157.33% 
  1996 296957.57 331241.46 21750.30 257.62% 
  1997 296957.57 305695.35 22180.10 139.39% 
  1998 296957.57 296353.87 21527.20 97.20% 
  1999 296957.57 292922.30 19987.70 79.81% 
  2000 296957.57 315418.12 21327.80 186.56% 
  2001 296957.57 312272.52 23013.50 166.55% 
  2002 296957.57 302454.43 23149.30 123.75% 
  2003 296957.57 315513.45 23268.60 179.75% 
  2004 296957.57 302549.75 23985.80 123.31% 
  2005 296957.57 301310.57 24363.50 117.87% 
     Average: 148.10% 
       
SW Meade 1995 235944.65 204755.87 35185.70 11.36% 
  1996 235944.65 211205.59 35136.70 29.59% 
  1997 235944.65 221288.95 34803.60 57.89% 
  1998 235944.65 219381.29 37596.00 55.94% 
  1999 235944.65 213022.41 41531.90 44.81% 
  2000 235944.65 199759.60 46886.90 22.82% 
  2001 235944.65 196580.17 51442.90 23.48% 
  2002 235944.65 194127.46 51442.30 18.71% 
  2003 235944.65 198306.15 51439.90 26.83% 
  2004 235944.65 177412.69 60173.80 2.73% 
  2005 235944.65 186951.01 63166.10 22.44% 
     Average: 28.78% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
EC Miami 1995 107409.57 71319.95 11668.10 -209.30% 
  1996 107409.57 93279.24 11199.80 -26.17% 
  1997 107409.57 93852.09 10175.40 -33.24% 
  1998 107409.57 87073.36 6297.00 -222.95% 
  1999 107409.57 68360.22 5982.40 -552.74% 
  2000 107409.57 71224.48 5975.70 -505.54% 
  2001 107409.57 71224.48 6306.80 -473.75% 
  2002 107409.57 70651.63 6307.20 -482.79% 
  2003 107409.57 74852.54 6370.20 -411.08% 
  2004 107409.57 69505.93 6451.50 -487.52% 
  2005 107409.57 75711.81 6649.30 -376.71% 
     Average: -343.80% 
       
NC Mitchell 1995 247547.03 265340.34 20502.40 186.79% 
  1996 247547.03 275704.48 20397.00 238.05% 
  1997 247547.03 268733.90 20885.10 201.44% 
  1998 247547.03 250482.01 19582.30 114.99% 
  1999 247547.03 263230.82 16374.90 195.78% 
  2000 247547.03 274970.73 16591.20 265.29% 
  2001 247547.03 285151.44 16876.40 322.82% 
  2002 247547.03 263047.38 16998.00 191.19% 
  2003 247547.03 266349.23 17217.80 209.20% 
  2004 247547.03 262313.64 16429.00 189.88% 
  2005 247547.03 272219.19 16208.40 252.22% 
     Average: 215.24% 
       
SE Montgomery 1995 123396.09 114667.40 3883.00 -124.79% 
  1996 123396.09 117423.83 3492.00 -71.03% 
  1997 123396.09 110624.64 3125.60 -308.61% 
  1998 123396.09 104192.98 2906.10 -560.79% 
  1999 123396.09 86643.72 2297.30 -1499.81% 
  2000 123396.09 103825.45 2169.20 -802.21% 
  2001 123396.09 104560.50 2381.10 -691.05% 
  2002 123396.09 103733.57 2406.90 -716.92% 
  2003 123396.09 106398.12 2342.70 -625.57% 
  2004 123396.09 108603.26 2379.30 -521.73% 
  2005 123396.09 98955.76 2384.10 -925.14% 
     Average: -622.51% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 77
Dist County Year A A* L S 
EC Morris 1995 126272.43 110718.26 5951.70 -161.34% 
  1996 126272.43 112494.99 5921.60 -132.66% 
  1997 126272.43 109409.09 6033.40 -179.50% 
  1998 126272.43 105668.61 4582.30 -349.64% 
  1999 126272.43 98187.65 4171.90 -573.19% 
  2000 126272.43 105575.10 4072.70 -408.20% 
  2001 126272.43 104546.47 4391.00 -394.78% 
  2002 126272.43 104359.44 4412.50 -396.61% 
  2003 126272.43 102395.69 4482.70 -432.64% 
  2004 126272.43 98468.18 4603.90 -503.93% 
  2005 126272.43 100618.96 4779.30 -436.76% 
     Average: -360.84% 
       
SW Morton 1995 202085.83 144019.24 87942.40 33.97% 
  1996 202085.83 187260.32 86919.40 82.94% 
  1997 202085.83 168198.95 85842.00 60.52% 
  1998 202085.83 161315.67 95765.30 57.43% 
  1999 202085.83 157168.06 96773.90 53.58% 
  2000 202085.83 138459.68 96578.60 34.12% 
  2001 202085.83 148255.10 96566.30 44.26% 
  2002 202085.83 153814.67 96626.70 50.04% 
  2003 202085.83 145254.70 96445.40 41.07% 
  2004 202085.83 123810.66 98806.30 20.78% 
  2005 202085.83 134312.06 95908.50 29.33% 
     Average: 46.19% 
       
NE Nemaha 1995 217570.51 201654.62 32453.00 50.96% 
  1996 217570.51 208283.57 31824.50 70.82% 
  1997 217570.51 213855.74 31447.20 88.19% 
  1998 217570.51 194641.38 29313.70 21.78% 
  1999 217570.51 193200.31 25720.10 5.25% 
  2000 217570.51 209628.58 26086.60 69.56% 
  2001 217570.51 210012.87 28302.90 73.30% 
  2002 217570.51 204536.78 28285.70 53.92% 
  2003 217570.51 208475.72 28390.00 67.96% 
  2004 217570.51 212126.44 29426.00 81.50% 
  2005 217570.51 206362.14 29690.20 62.25% 
     Average: 58.68% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
SE Neosho 1995 135696.04 113173.10 17193.60 -31.00% 
  1996 135696.04 105820.57 17283.60 -72.85% 
  1997 135696.04 113359.24 16124.90 -38.52% 
  1998 135696.04 115499.85 8187.20 -146.68% 
  1999 135696.04 103493.82 7382.60 -336.19% 
  2000 135696.04 115685.99 6764.50 -195.81% 
  2001 135696.04 115872.13 6950.40 -185.22% 
  2002 135696.04 114476.08 6998.30 -203.22% 
  2003 135696.04 119315.72 6965.60 -135.16% 
  2004 135696.04 105541.36 9450.50 -219.08% 
  2005 135696.04 101911.63 9382.70 -260.07% 
     Average: -165.80% 
       
WC Ness 1995 205617.60 185468.77 38969.40 48.30% 
  1996 205617.60 231330.78 39228.80 165.55% 
  1997 205617.60 192848.86 39178.40 67.41% 
  1998 205617.60 203479.71 41346.50 94.83% 
  1999 205617.60 213934.84 42040.70 119.78% 
  2000 205617.60 210156.94 38720.90 111.72% 
  2001 205617.60 225532.13 41225.30 148.31% 
  2002 205617.60 198208.22 41616.20 82.20% 
  2003 205617.60 190652.41 41728.70 64.14% 
  2004 205617.60 179230.83 61997.40 57.44% 
  2005 205617.60 185117.34 68811.80 70.21% 
     Average: 93.62% 
       
NW Norton 1995 168778.41 173598.06 42925.30 111.23% 
  1996 168778.41 183990.45 42552.70 135.75% 
  1997 168778.41 183357.87 42515.50 134.29% 
  1998 168778.41 178929.81 36584.80 127.75% 
  1999 168778.41 185797.82 34678.80 149.08% 
  2000 168778.41 185797.82 27870.60 161.07% 
  2001 168778.41 193027.31 29699.70 181.65% 
  2002 168778.41 177755.02 29450.10 130.48% 
  2003 168778.41 193569.52 28897.00 185.79% 
  2004 168778.41 204323.38 30424.60 216.83% 
  2005 168778.41 197907.21 30103.30 196.76% 
     Average: 157.33% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
EC Osage 1995 143610.21 114286.33 16522.30 -77.48% 
  1996 143610.21 138776.25 15640.10 69.09% 
  1997 143610.21 134262.43 14802.50 36.85% 
  1998 143610.21 120432.82 14244.70 -62.71% 
  1999 143610.21 113518.02 13832.00 -117.55% 
  2000 143610.21 120048.66 15065.70 -56.39% 
  2001 143610.21 119280.35 16427.80 -48.10% 
  2002 143610.21 118608.08 16551.30 -51.06% 
  2003 143610.21 118608.08 16583.90 -50.76% 
  2004 143610.21 113421.98 16599.20 -81.87% 
  2005 143610.21 113806.13 16570.20 -79.87% 
     Average: -47.26% 
       
NC Osborne 1995 189004.48 187890.39 22384.90 95.02% 
  1996 189004.48 208395.74 22231.00 187.23% 
  1997 189004.48 206047.11 22144.70 176.96% 
  1998 189004.48 191052.01 20413.40 110.03% 
  1999 189004.48 188342.05 19568.80 96.61% 
  2000 189004.48 191232.67 14596.90 115.26% 
  2001 189004.48 187980.72 14685.90 93.03% 
  2002 189004.48 179218.53 14580.00 32.88% 
  2003 189004.48 177411.89 14600.90 20.60% 
  2004 189004.48 174521.27 15439.40 6.19% 
  2005 189004.48 180663.84 15192.60 45.10% 
     Average: 88.99% 
       
NC Ottawa 1995 192073.96 188357.38 17574.80 78.85% 
  1996 192073.96 197679.29 17405.20 132.20% 
  1997 192073.96 187991.81 17382.60 76.52% 
  1998 192073.96 178121.56 14821.10 5.86% 
  1999 192073.96 184153.38 14498.10 45.37% 
  2000 192073.96 179309.65 15544.50 17.89% 
  2001 192073.96 181228.86 16269.80 33.34% 
  2002 192073.96 173460.60 16263.80 -14.45% 
  2003 192073.96 172820.87 16218.40 -18.71% 
  2004 192073.96 171541.39 15710.00 -30.70% 
  2005 192073.96 174100.34 15872.10 -13.24% 
     Average: 28.45% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
SC Pawnee 1995 272663.16 246719.86 58898.50 55.95% 
  1996 272663.16 265607.07 58298.50 87.90% 
  1997 272663.16 242796.43 58574.60 49.01% 
  1998 272663.16 236956.91 55418.30 35.57% 
  1999 272663.16 246537.38 46646.90 43.99% 
  2000 272663.16 249730.87 28918.20 20.70% 
  2001 272663.16 253745.54 31434.80 39.82% 
  2002 272663.16 244712.53 31482.90 11.22% 
  2003 272663.16 246446.14 31390.10 16.48% 
  2004 272663.16 243252.65 31989.60 8.06% 
  2005 272663.16 246446.14 31850.90 17.69% 
     Average: 35.13% 
       
NC Phillips 1995 171393.56 165677.42 27002.10 78.83% 
  1996 171393.56 174206.27 27149.40 110.36% 
  1997 171393.56 188088.33 26776.30 162.35% 
  1998 171393.56 188632.72 23019.80 174.89% 
  1999 171393.56 189177.12 21428.30 182.99% 
  2000 171393.56 194983.99 18567.40 227.05% 
  2001 171393.56 182281.45 18844.00 157.78% 
  2002 171393.56 174659.93 19178.00 117.03% 
  2003 171393.56 176020.92 18953.20 124.41% 
  2004 171393.56 176565.31 19545.10 126.46% 
  2005 171393.56 174659.93 19277.20 116.94% 
     Average: 143.55% 
       
NE Pottawatomie 1995 123325.63 102211.51 14408.10 -46.54% 
  1996 123325.63 110273.27 14490.80 9.93% 
  1997 123325.63 113728.30 14607.10 34.30% 
  1998 123325.63 102499.43 13526.40 -53.97% 
  1999 123325.63 96453.12 13134.30 -104.60% 
  2000 123325.63 101539.70 12793.90 -70.28% 
  2001 123325.63 94149.76 13529.20 -115.65% 
  2002 123325.63 92518.21 13725.40 -124.46% 
  2003 123325.63 92422.24 13773.30 -124.37% 
  2004 123325.63 88391.37 13926.60 -150.85% 
  2005 123325.63 91846.40 13782.60 -128.40% 
     Average: -79.54% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
SC Pratt 1995 277908.01 264577.31 47173.80 71.74% 
  1996 277908.01 263558.99 47041.30 69.50% 
  1997 277908.01 259115.43 47381.30 60.34% 
  1998 277908.01 245692.16 47669.90 32.42% 
  1999 277908.01 252820.38 45897.60 45.34% 
  2000 277908.01 268928.30 47577.00 81.13% 
  2001 277908.01 269946.62 47864.20 83.37% 
  2002 277908.01 270779.79 47766.10 85.08% 
  2003 277908.01 278926.33 47824.10 102.13% 
  2004 277908.01 267539.69 50204.10 79.35% 
  2005 277908.01 263558.99 49780.70 71.18% 
     Average: 71.05% 
       
NW Rawlins 1995 199901.74 217944.92 12952.90 239.30% 
  1996 199901.74 220709.36 12919.90 261.05% 
  1997 199901.74 220976.88 12695.70 266.00% 
  1998 199901.74 218301.62 8388.80 319.34% 
  1999 199901.74 213575.32 6866.70 299.13% 
  2000 199901.74 226773.29 5676.90 573.35% 
  2001 199901.74 225435.66 6152.30 515.03% 
  2002 199901.74 221422.76 6133.20 450.89% 
  2003 199901.74 226238.24 6191.60 525.36% 
  2004 199901.74 231856.30 6174.20 617.55% 
  2005 199901.74 235155.79 6213.90 667.34% 
     Average: 430.39% 
       
SC Reno 1995 466831.88 397593.20 95910.80 27.81% 
  1996 466831.88 441116.44 95263.10 73.01% 
  1997 466831.88 435045.60 93661.20 66.06% 
  1998 466831.88 410015.07 89475.40 36.50% 
  1999 466831.88 405438.59 81684.80 24.84% 
  2000 466831.88 404504.61 82105.60 24.09% 
  2001 466831.88 391615.76 85218.60 11.74% 
  2002 466831.88 396565.82 85101.10 17.43% 
  2003 466831.88 391522.36 84986.90 11.39% 
  2004 466831.88 377979.72 89241.50 0.44% 
  2005 466831.88 386105.30 87718.40 7.97% 
     Average: 27.39% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
NC Republic 1995 262647.02 275546.42 15074.30 185.57% 
  1996 262647.02 281061.15 14236.50 229.34% 
  1997 262647.02 277067.73 14352.00 200.48% 
  1998 262647.02 265943.18 11578.30 128.47% 
  1999 262647.02 268605.47 10979.60 154.27% 
  2000 262647.02 271648.08 11724.60 176.77% 
  2001 262647.02 277638.22 12520.70 219.73% 
  2002 262647.02 264421.88 12555.70 114.14% 
  2003 262647.02 261189.10 12466.90 88.31% 
  2004 262647.02 260143.21 12816.80 80.46% 
  2005 262647.02 259667.80 13162.40 77.37% 
     Average: 150.45% 
       
C Rice 1995 279695.86 267725.91 16486.10 27.39% 
  1996 279695.86 267255.88 16403.00 24.16% 
  1997 279695.86 273272.20 16512.90 61.10% 
  1998 279695.86 264905.76 16166.00 8.51% 
  1999 279695.86 268947.97 14831.70 27.53% 
  2000 279695.86 278348.46 13681.10 90.15% 
  2001 279695.86 279382.51 14799.90 97.88% 
  2002 279695.86 270358.05 14776.00 36.80% 
  2003 279695.86 267631.90 14806.10 18.52% 
  2004 279695.86 271768.12 15211.90 47.88% 
  2005 279695.86 276656.37 15437.20 80.31% 
     Average: 47.30% 
       
NE Riley 1995 88252.34 77342.63 4105.10 -165.76% 
  1996 88252.34 88661.06 4424.00 109.24% 
  1997 88252.34 85359.85 4533.80 36.20% 
  1998 88252.34 75739.18 4030.20 -210.48% 
  1999 88252.34 78097.19 3883.60 -161.49% 
  2000 88252.34 83567.76 4141.80 -13.10% 
  2001 88252.34 81021.12 4208.70 -71.82% 
  2002 88252.34 78002.87 4130.80 -148.12% 
  2003 88252.34 76776.70 4144.30 -176.90% 
  2004 88252.34 77342.63 4423.60 -146.63% 
  2005 88252.34 66495.79 4439.40 -390.08% 
     Average: -121.72% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
NC Rooks 1995 165678.33 155144.39 42737.50 75.35% 
  1996 165678.33 152995.82 42816.00 70.38% 
  1997 165678.33 159352.00 43225.50 85.36% 
  1998 165678.33 164633.89 34872.30 97.00% 
  1999 165678.33 163201.51 29691.90 91.66% 
  2000 165678.33 177793.86 27481.60 144.09% 
  2001 165678.33 176719.57 28598.50 138.61% 
  2002 165678.33 163917.70 28657.40 93.86% 
  2003 165678.33 160068.18 28749.00 80.49% 
  2004 165678.33 152816.77 28557.30 54.96% 
  2005 165678.33 157113.91 28774.60 70.24% 
     Average: 91.09% 
       
C Rush 1995 178719.37 164678.40 36285.40 61.30% 
  1996 178719.37 188089.87 36591.00 125.61% 
  1997 178719.37 164323.68 36899.00 60.99% 
  1998 178719.37 178689.81 36218.80 99.92% 
  1999 178719.37 178069.05 33925.80 98.08% 
  2000 178719.37 186316.27 19858.60 138.25% 
  2001 178719.37 190395.55 23168.10 150.40% 
  2002 178719.37 176206.78 23396.70 89.26% 
  2003 178719.37 172038.83 23603.30 71.70% 
  2004 178719.37 164146.32 30311.50 51.92% 
  2005 178719.37 168225.59 35366.60 70.33% 
     Average: 92.52% 
       
C Russell 1995 161306.97 137438.59 51490.70 53.65% 
  1996 161306.97 144923.76 51946.70 68.46% 
  1997 161306.97 125805.01 52289.50 32.10% 
  1998 161306.97 127608.66 45991.80 26.73% 
  1999 161306.97 129051.59 44201.90 27.03% 
  2000 161306.97 133921.46 39141.20 30.03% 
  2001 161306.97 134282.19 40866.70 33.87% 
  2002 161306.97 133109.81 41211.90 31.58% 
  2003 161306.97 135274.20 41163.60 36.76% 
  2004 161306.97 126436.29 43950.80 20.66% 
  2005 161306.97 129141.77 45229.10 28.88% 
     Average: 35.43% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
C Saline 1995 211041.21 191048.48 21671.30 7.75% 
  1996 211041.21 206111.91 22058.70 77.65% 
  1997 211041.21 216858.39 21999.80 126.44% 
  1998 211041.21 221083.50 19596.30 151.25% 
  1999 211041.21 207948.92 19305.30 83.98% 
  2000 211041.21 202529.75 18521.50 54.05% 
  2001 211041.21 212541.43 18816.60 107.97% 
  2002 211041.21 192150.68 19002.60 0.59% 
  2003 211041.21 192701.78 19058.40 3.77% 
  2004 211041.21 194263.23 19201.60 12.62% 
  2005 211041.21 196375.79 19278.50 23.93% 
     Average: 59.09% 
       
WC Scott 1995 223059.25 220664.30 21088.40 88.64% 
  1996 223059.25 265120.48 21609.00 294.65% 
  1997 223059.25 208809.32 21791.20 34.61% 
  1998 223059.25 240871.66 14418.30 223.54% 
  1999 223059.25 258205.08 15388.60 328.39% 
  2000 223059.25 249942.52 14858.40 280.93% 
  2001 223059.25 289908.17 15586.90 528.88% 
  2002 223059.25 260091.10 15605.60 337.30% 
  2003 223059.25 250930.43 15628.70 278.33% 
  2004 223059.25 257845.84 17140.10 302.95% 
  2005 223059.25 258474.51 17423.30 303.26% 
     Average: 272.86% 
       
SC Sedgwick 1995 380955.72 354893.79 7641.30 -241.07% 
  1996 380955.72 364396.52 7539.30 -119.64% 
  1997 380955.72 373052.46 7496.20 -5.43% 
  1998 380955.72 364114.26 5926.10 -184.19% 
  1999 380955.72 365525.55 4740.40 -225.50% 
  2000 380955.72 350942.17 3694.60 -712.36% 
  2001 380955.72 341439.44 3934.00 -904.48% 
  2002 380955.72 337205.56 3949.70 -1007.68% 
  2003 380955.72 342192.13 4144.70 -835.26% 
  2004 380955.72 323939.38 4107.60 -1288.07% 
  2005 380955.72 337205.56 4200.60 -941.52% 
     Average: -587.75% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
SW Seward 1995 192417.34 170338.14 43063.10 48.73% 
  1996 192417.34 192206.49 43386.90 99.51% 
  1997 192417.34 152807.32 42608.40 7.04% 
  1998 192417.34 165729.52 41049.70 34.99% 
  1999 192417.34 169524.85 40241.40 43.11% 
  2000 192417.34 173049.09 43660.70 55.64% 
  2001 192417.34 173229.82 44294.70 56.68% 
  2002 192417.34 177567.35 44291.20 66.47% 
  2003 192417.34 178742.09 44300.00 69.13% 
  2004 192417.34 156783.38 51489.40 30.79% 
  2005 192417.34 152084.40 53454.40 24.55% 
     Average: 48.79% 
       
EC Shawnee 1995 101418.61 87442.08 6371.10 -119.37% 
  1996 101418.61 94704.71 6263.40 -7.19% 
  1997 101418.61 90250.29 6522.90 -71.22% 
  1998 101418.61 84924.36 5634.10 -192.76% 
  1999 101418.61 83375.00 5256.10 -243.29% 
  2000 101418.61 83956.01 5506.50 -217.13% 
  2001 101418.61 80760.46 6366.40 -224.49% 
  2002 101418.61 82697.16 6531.60 -186.63% 
  2003 101418.61 83278.17 6456.80 -180.95% 
  2004 101418.61 81050.96 6553.90 -210.77% 
  2005 101418.61 79017.42 6433.50 -248.20% 
     Average: -172.91% 
       
NW Sheridan 1995 202458.57 226288.77 9058.20 363.08% 
  1996 202458.57 238241.60 8851.60 504.25% 
  1997 202458.57 234347.87 8601.70 470.73% 
  1998 202458.57 236611.67 4535.10 853.08% 
  1999 202458.57 241410.91 4146.50 1039.40% 
  2000 202458.57 256714.15 5802.30 1035.07% 
  2001 202458.57 251190.50 7498.90 749.85% 
  2002 202458.57 244670.77 7528.20 660.72% 
  2003 202458.57 247025.12 7473.40 696.34% 
  2004 202458.57 272289.05 10290.10 778.62% 
  2005 202458.57 261151.19 10234.90 673.46% 
     Average: 711.33% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
NW Sherman 1995 285606.34 284281.53 39100.80 96.61% 
  1996 285606.34 313397.39 38684.60 171.84% 
  1997 285606.34 308127.96 39037.40 157.69% 
  1998 285606.34 297053.21 37859.70 130.23% 
  1999 285606.34 311700.46 40951.70 163.72% 
  2000 285606.34 297231.84 41198.70 128.22% 
  2001 285606.34 314558.45 43043.80 167.26% 
  2002 285606.34 292855.53 42972.40 116.87% 
  2003 285606.34 305805.83 42755.60 147.24% 
  2004 285606.34 341798.75 45404.90 223.76% 
  2005 285606.34 302501.27 46248.10 136.53% 
     Average: 149.09% 
       
NC Smith 1995 218029.04 217440.03 21664.00 97.28% 
  1996 218029.04 227298.30 21543.50 143.03% 
  1997 218029.04 223113.18 21506.50 123.64% 
  1998 218029.04 210557.84 16153.90 53.75% 
  1999 218029.04 217347.02 16387.80 95.84% 
  2000 218029.04 238179.60 14362.90 240.30% 
  2001 218029.04 237063.57 14758.50 228.97% 
  2002 218029.04 233343.47 14782.60 203.60% 
  2003 218029.04 222462.17 14776.30 130.00% 
  2004 218029.04 223113.18 15472.30 132.86% 
  2005 218029.04 232320.44 16084.90 188.85% 
     Average: 148.92% 
       
SC Stafford 1995 294016.86 265634.35 35838.40 20.80% 
  1996 294016.86 263410.69 36144.40 15.32% 
  1997 294016.86 264337.21 38296.80 22.50% 
  1998 294016.86 265541.69 39089.90 27.15% 
  1999 294016.86 267580.05 39071.60 32.34% 
  2000 294016.86 249976.10 38300.20 -14.99% 
  2001 294016.86 263225.38 40867.40 24.66% 
  2002 294016.86 251180.58 41094.60 -4.24% 
  2003 294016.86 253682.19 41209.60 2.12% 
  2004 294016.86 257388.29 43479.90 15.76% 
  2005 294016.86 253960.15 43709.50 8.36% 
     Average: 13.62% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
SW Stanton 1995 253438.54 196581.78 99898.10 43.09% 
  1996 253438.54 223408.99 99583.30 69.84% 
  1997 253438.54 193862.81 98842.40 39.73% 
  1998 253438.54 210811.08 99287.50 57.07% 
  1999 253438.54 212261.20 99667.80 58.69% 
  2000 253438.54 198938.23 101719.30 46.42% 
  2001 253438.54 233106.66 101731.80 80.01% 
  2002 253438.54 215252.07 101702.30 62.45% 
  2003 253438.54 218696.10 101702.30 65.84% 
  2004 253438.54 191597.00 103658.20 40.34% 
  2005 253438.54 207548.31 101759.50 54.90% 
     Average: 56.22% 
       
SW Stevens 1995 306743.89 253447.30 68055.50 21.69% 
  1996 306743.89 278052.92 66596.00 56.92% 
  1997 306743.89 295922.40 65335.60 83.44% 
  1998 306743.89 265422.66 57031.90 27.55% 
  1999 306743.89 281233.88 52335.50 51.26% 
  2000 306743.89 270194.09 53443.30 31.61% 
  2001 306743.89 279549.84 54502.20 50.10% 
  2002 306743.89 297793.56 55285.60 83.81% 
  2003 306743.89 285537.52 55155.80 61.55% 
  2004 306743.89 274310.62 62042.00 47.72% 
  2005 306743.89 255786.23 62377.40 18.31% 
     Average: 48.54% 
       
SC Sumner 1995 517416.35 520700.46 7957.80 141.27% 
  1996 517416.35 587917.32 7993.80 981.95% 
  1997 517416.35 539392.27 8040.40 373.32% 
  1998 517416.35 520240.07 7318.10 138.59% 
  1999 517416.35 515452.02 7248.00 72.90% 
  2000 517416.35 524475.65 6029.90 217.07% 
  2001 517416.35 520240.07 6182.00 145.68% 
  2002 517416.35 500811.63 6675.20 -148.75% 
  2003 517416.35 527882.53 6731.70 255.48% 
  2004 517416.35 506980.85 7073.90 -47.52% 
  2005 517416.35 516741.11 7559.60 91.07% 
     Average: 201.91% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
NW Thomas 1995 314214.25 327170.92 18333.40 170.67% 
  1996 314214.25 320632.88 18188.70 135.29% 
  1997 314214.25 350546.67 17695.80 305.32% 
  1998 314214.25 344725.12 17001.50 279.46% 
  1999 314214.25 353054.41 15436.00 351.62% 
  2000 314214.25 356009.97 15272.10 373.67% 
  2001 314214.25 365951.38 16055.80 422.23% 
  2002 314214.25 347322.43 16316.00 302.92% 
  2003 314214.25 361115.02 16519.60 383.91% 
  2004 314214.25 368727.81 21280.30 356.17% 
  2005 314214.25 375534.54 21860.60 380.51% 
     Average: 314.71% 
       
WC Trego 1995 158304.87 136507.30 32713.30 33.37% 
  1996 158304.87 162936.86 32546.90 114.23% 
  1997 158304.87 147496.91 32048.20 66.28% 
  1998 158304.87 147133.62 28470.20 60.76% 
  1999 158304.87 141320.93 26984.40 37.06% 
  2000 158304.87 146679.50 21962.10 47.07% 
  2001 158304.87 137869.65 22889.50 10.72% 
  2002 158304.87 142683.28 23180.20 32.61% 
  2003 158304.87 135417.42 23395.50 2.17% 
  2004 158304.87 135144.95 24823.00 6.70% 
  2005 158304.87 149949.14 24821.10 66.34% 
     Average: 43.39% 
       
EC Wabaunsee 1995 84658.41 69119.24 13697.00 -13.45% 
  1996 84658.41 72442.28 14026.30 12.91% 
  1997 84658.41 77284.42 13633.40 45.91% 
  1998 84658.41 65321.48 11661.50 -65.82% 
  1999 84658.41 66365.86 10686.00 -71.18% 
  2000 84658.41 65226.53 11856.90 -63.89% 
  2001 84658.41 67220.36 13043.40 -33.69% 
  2002 84658.41 69499.01 13071.10 -15.98% 
  2003 84658.41 66935.53 13083.90 -35.46% 
  2004 84658.41 63612.49 13185.30 -59.62% 
  2005 84658.41 62283.27 13091.90 -70.91% 
     Average: -33.74% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
WC Wallace 1995 161749.67 147509.99 68266.80 79.14% 
  1996 161749.67 160352.46 68067.50 97.95% 
  1997 161749.67 117009.13 67250.10 33.47% 
  1998 161749.67 133597.32 62888.60 55.23% 
  1999 161749.67 148045.09 53637.70 74.45% 
  2000 161749.67 134845.89 62844.30 57.19% 
  2001 161749.67 158301.23 63649.70 94.58% 
  2002 161749.67 153574.49 64322.50 87.29% 
  2003 161749.67 156428.37 64202.40 91.71% 
  2004 161749.67 155001.43 65254.00 89.66% 
  2005 161749.67 159460.62 66355.40 96.55% 
     Average: 77.93% 
       
NC Washington 1995 279500.37 266430.78 28712.00 54.48% 
  1996 279500.37 262746.10 29157.70 42.54% 
  1997 279500.37 279752.32 29681.40 100.85% 
  1998 279500.37 277106.91 26172.80 90.86% 
  1999 279500.37 274461.49 23067.30 78.16% 
  2000 279500.37 261517.87 24847.60 27.63% 
  2001 279500.37 263501.93 25923.90 38.29% 
  2002 279500.37 258211.11 26144.40 18.57% 
  2003 279500.37 256416.00 26026.00 11.30% 
  2004 279500.37 258966.94 26787.20 23.35% 
  2005 279500.37 256604.96 28070.30 18.44% 
     Average: 45.86% 
       
WC Wichita 1995 212718.75 203651.46 45830.70 80.22% 
  1996 212718.75 263223.59 46549.20 208.50% 
  1997 212718.75 214078.85 46492.50 102.93% 
  1998 212718.75 216436.34 43637.10 108.52% 
  1999 212718.75 224415.56 45635.60 125.63% 
  2000 212718.75 220244.61 43851.50 117.16% 
  2001 212718.75 245179.67 44521.60 172.91% 
  2002 212718.75 231578.73 44532.00 142.35% 
  2003 212718.75 224868.93 44519.20 127.29% 
  2004 212718.75 208094.43 45419.50 89.82% 
  2005 212718.75 225140.95 45663.70 127.20% 
     Average: 127.50% 
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Dist County Year A A* L S 
SE Wilson 1995 136194.05 131725.08 11283.70 60.39% 
  1996 136194.05 132287.61 10717.80 63.55% 
  1997 136194.05 138662.92 10490.70 123.53% 
  1998 136194.05 133693.93 6788.70 63.17% 
  1999 136194.05 129474.97 4897.80 -37.19% 
  2000 136194.05 135850.28 4031.00 91.47% 
  2001 136194.05 135756.53 4177.30 89.53% 
  2002 136194.05 136131.54 4165.40 98.50% 
  2003 136194.05 137444.11 4181.90 129.89% 
  2004 136194.05 129193.71 4849.00 -44.37% 
  2005 136194.05 129849.99 4929.30 -28.70% 
     Average: 55.44% 
       
SE Woodson 1995 78393.72 72182.45 4337.00 -43.22% 
  1996 78393.72 72841.22 4268.70 -30.07% 
  1997 78393.72 71994.23 4046.80 -58.14% 
  1998 78393.72 71523.68 2455.00 -179.84% 
  1999 78393.72 72653.00 1819.60 -215.49% 
  2000 78393.72 71806.01 1595.50 -312.89% 
  2001 78393.72 71523.68 1707.10 -302.44% 
  2002 78393.72 71429.57 1732.30 -302.02% 
  2003 78393.72 74158.76 1764.90 -139.95% 
  2004 78393.72 64465.42 4974.70 -179.98% 
  2005 78393.72 67194.61 4736.00 -136.47% 
     Average: -172.77% 
       
NE Wyandotte 1995 10346.74 7063.05 169.80 -1833.86% 
  1996 10346.74 6784.24 169.80 -1998.06% 
  1997 10346.74 11059.24 169.80 519.61% 
  1998 10346.74 7248.91 165.80 -1768.41% 
  1999 10346.74 8271.20 147.80 -1304.29% 
  2000 10346.74 8271.20 350.40 -492.34% 
  2001 10346.74 7434.78 127.00 -2192.88% 
  2002 10346.74 7341.85 127.00 -2266.06% 
  2003 10346.74 7527.72 127.00 -2119.70% 
  2004 10346.74 8085.33 50.40 -4386.93% 
  2005 10346.74 371.74 50.40 -19691.67% 
        Average: -3412.24% 
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Appendix B - Scatterplots for Regression Variables 
Figure B.1 Scatterplots: Output Prices vs. Slippage 
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Figure B.2 Scatterplots: Land Values vs. Slippage 
200015001000 120010008006004 0
200.00%
100.00%
0.00%
800600400200
200.00%
100.00%
0.00%
Land Value Irr Cropland
Sl
ip
pa
ge
Land Value NI Cropland
Land Value Pastureland
 
 
Figure B.3 Scatterplots: Wheat Input Costs vs. Slippage 
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Figure B.4 Scatterplots: Input Costs vs. Slippage 
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Figure B.5 Scatterplots: Corn Input Costs vs. Slippage 
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Figure B.6 Scatterplots: Soybean Input Costs vs. Slippage 
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Figure B.7 Scatterplots: Combined Variables at District Level 
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